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Abstract
This Article discusses the ongoing coronavirus
pandemic as an instance of ideological contestation
between the People’s Republic of China and its
ideological Other—the “Western” liberal democracies.
Much of this ideological contestation highlights the
idiosyncratic aspects of opposing ideological
narratives. From the illiberal perspective, promoters
of liberal narratives on governance and public health
can be said to focus too much on procedural
legitimacy and, consequently, appear to be ill-placed
to acknowledge and respond to public health
emergencies. Conversely, from the liberal perspective,
advocates of illiberal narratives appear to be
responding to a never-ending emergency and,
consequently, seem unable to take full advantage of
procedural legitimacy and rule-based governance in
order to prevent public health emergencies from
occurring. The coronavirus pandemic also exposes
the aspirational qualities of both ideological narratives.
On one hand, it appears aspirational to assume that the
coronavirus response in liberal democratic countries
can be based on the respect for individual freedom,
human dignity, and other liberal first principles. On
the other hand, the image of a strong, stable
government projected by the CCP also seems to be
based on aspirational notions about the coherence and
resilience of the P.R.C.’s governance project. In the
middle of the pandemic, it appears that the
coronavirus follows no ideological script.

†

Associate Professor, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Faculty of Law.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2020

2020]

U. PA. ASIAN L. REV.

25

Abstract ...................................................................................24
I. INTRODUCTION.........................................................................25
II. LIBERAL NARRATIVES ON PUBLIC HEALTH: THE
CONVENTIONAL APPROACH .....................................................33
III. LIBERAL NARRATIVES ON PUBLIC HEALTH: THE HUMAN
RIGHTS-BASED APPROACH .......................................................37
IV. QUESTIONING LIBERAL NARRATIVES .......................................43
V. ILLIBERAL EXCEPTIONALISM ...................................................47
VI. IDEOLOGICAL UNMASKING ......................................................56
VII. CONCLUSION ............................................................................65

I.

INTRODUCTION

Does illiberal political thought provide a more effective
means for managing public health emergencies, such as the ongoing
COVID-19 (“coronavirus”) pandemic, than a self-consciously liberal
approach to public health? Answers to this question relate to a central
point of contestation in contemporary political thought: Namely,
whether an illiberal government, which defines itself by its
willingness to restrict and suspend individual rights, is more effective
in tackling political emergencies and economic and developmental
challenges than a liberal government. 1
1

For recent discussion on the respective merits of liberalism and different forms
of illiberalism (mainly authoritarianism) in the coronavirus pandemic, see, for
example, Florian Bieber, Authoritarianism in the Time of the Coronavirus,
FOREIGN POL’Y (Mar. 30, 2020),
https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/03/30/authoritarianism-coronavirus-lockdownpandemic-populism [https://perma.cc/WB6P-G8VL] (discussing how COVID-19,
like other pandemics, is subject to abuse under both authoritarian and democratic
regimes); Francis Fukuyama, The Pandemic and Political Order: It Takes a State,
FOREIGN AFF. (July/Aug. 2020),
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2020-06-09/pandemic-andpolitical-order [https://perma.cc/4LU8-ZJSB] (arguing that the particular regime
type may not matter when responding to crises, and explaining the effectiveness
of a government’s coronavirus response on the basis of factors such as a
“competent state apparatus, a government that citizens trust . . . and effective
leaders”); Matthew M. Kavanagh, Authoritarianism, Outbreaks, and Information
Politics, 5 LANCET PUB. HEALTH (Mar. 2020),
https://www.thelancet.com/action/showPdf?pii=S2468-2667%2820%2930030-X
[https://perma.cc/TET2-S2FP] (suggesting that China’s authoritarian regime may
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As of August 2020, it is too early to draw conclusions about
the efficiency of liberal and illiberal responses to the coronavirus
pandemic. In fact, the time may never be ripe for drawing final
conclusions about the pandemic, as ideological narratives allow their
promoters to justify even the most inconvenient facts. Be that as it
may, even in the middle of the pandemic, it is still possible to examine
the challenges against various ideological narratives on public health
emergencies. It seems particularly fruitful to view such challenges in
the context of the ideological contestation—and “Othering”—
between the People’s Republic of China (“the P.R.C.”) and “Western”
liberal democracies.2
Much of North American and European commentary on the
Chinese government’s coronavirus response uses what could be
considered liberal narratives on public health. At play in this
commentary are two distinct approaches to the relationship between
human rights and public health. The first, more conventional
approach views human rights as checks and balances for public health
measures, suggesting that there is a trade-off between human rights
and public health. The government may restrict specific rights, such
as the freedom of movement, in public health emergencies, but these
restrictions must be necessary, proportional, and non-discriminatory. 3
have prevented a timely response to the coronavirus outbreak); Minxin Pei,
China’s Coming Upheaval: Competition, the Coronavirus, and the Weakness of
Xi Jinping, FOREIGN AFF. (Apr. 3, 2020),
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-04-03/chinas-comingupheaval [https://perma.cc/CH8W-R6VV]; Zhao Yanjing (赵燕菁), Jinkuai Jianli
Zhongguo Kangyi de Hexin Xushi (尽快建立中国抗疫的核心叙事) [Establish a
Core Narrative for China’s Fight Against the Epidemic As Soon As Possible], AI
SIXIANG (April 10, 2020), http://www.aisixiang.com/data/120808.html
[https://perma.cc/WU7X-TNFM] (discussing China’s rebuttal to the Western
critiques of China’s initial handling of the coronavirus pandemic).
2
For China and “the Orient” as the Other of Europeans, see Teemu Ruskola,
Legal Orientalism, 101 MICH. L. REV. 179, 197 (2002) (discussing how the West
differentiates itself from China); Teemu Ruskola, Where Is Asia? When Is Asia?
Theorizing Comparative Law and International Law, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 879,
882 (2011) (describing the Orient as Europe’s first Other). Conversely, Western
liberal democracies act as the Other in the Chinese ideological discourse. See
infra text accompanying notes 104–106.
3
According to the Siracusa Principles, restrictions on rights must be, inter alia,
provided for by the law, applied in a non-arbitrary and non-discriminatory
manner, pursue a legitimate aim, be proportional to their aims, and constitute the
least restrictive means available. ECOSOC, Siracusa Principles on the Limitation
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The second, more recently developed human rights-based approach
to health contends that the trade-off between human rights and public
health is unnecessary. Instead, this approach suggests that the
implementation of human rights obligations (e.g., freedom of
expression and the right to information) correlates positively with the
attainment of public health objectives. 4 The former approach
facilitates normative assessments of public health measures, whereas
the latter approach provides an empirical and normative argument
about the mutually reinforcing linkages between health and human
rights.
The human rights-based approach is particularly important for
understanding the ideological contestation regarding the coronavirus
pandemic. This approach suggests that the illiberal nature of China’s
governance model (including the lack of rights protections in the
P.R.C.) was a catalyst for the coronavirus pandemic.5 The outline of
this narrative is presently as follows: local authorities in Wuhan,
accustomed to repressing inconvenient truths and appeasing their
superiors, silenced early warnings about the virus, allowing it to
spread unnoticed. 6 Once the authorities had no choice but to
acknowledge the outbreak, their excessively coercive measures drove
the pandemic underground, making it more difficult to identify,

and Derogation Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1985/4, annex (1985) [hereinafter Siracusa Principles].
4
See LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN & ZITA LAZZARINI, HUMAN RIGHTS AND PUBLIC
HEALTH IN THE AIDS PANDEMIC 19 (1997) (stating that “[f]reedom of expression
is critical in medicine and health care”); see also Daniel Tarantola et al., Human
Rights, Health and Development, 13 AUSTL. J. HUM. RTS 1, 4 (2008) (discussing
public health and rights relating to information).
5
Salvatore Babones, The ‘Chinese Virus’ Spread Along the New Silk Road,
FOREIGN POL’Y (Apr. 6, 2020), https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/04/06/chinesecoronavirus-spread-worldwide-on-new-silk-road/ [https://perma.cc/9AQA6XPD]; Kavanagh, supra note 1; Pei, supra note 1. Chinese scholars are aware of
this narrative and the strategic need to respond to it. See Zhao, supra note 1.
6
Jane Cai, Lack of Free Speech Helped Spread of Coronavirus in China, Says
Leading Professor, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Feb. 18, 2020),
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/3051219/china-paying-heavyprice-coronavirus-because-lack-free-speech [https://perma.cc/2QCS-5ANT];
Edward Wong, Julian E. Barnes & Zolan Kanno-Youngs, Local Officials in
China Hid Coronavirus Dangers from Beijing, U.S. Agencies Find, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 19, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/19/world/asia/chinacoronavirus-beijing-trump.html [https://perma.cc/8YKR-ZV84].
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isolate, and treat infected people. 7 Up to five million people left
Wuhan, the epicenter of the outbreak, in anticipation of strict
quarantine measures, helping the virus to spread domestically and
internationally. 8 These people and other citizens from Hubei, the
province in which Wuhan is located, faced discrimination elsewhere
in China, deterring them from seeking medical attention and further
worsening the outbreak. 9 From this perspective, the coronavirus
pandemic was a consequence of the pathologies of illiberalism.
Illiberal political thought also views public health through its
internal ideological prism. In the imagination of nineteenth and
twentieth century theorists of, and for, dictatorial governments, the
inability of liberal governments to respond to political emergencies
demonstrated the need for strong, law-transcending political
leadership. 10 In a similar vein, Chinese commentary on the
coronavirus has highlighted the unique strengths of China’s
authoritarian government and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).11
The Chinese government’s white paper on the coronavirus response
7

Josephine Ma & Zhuang Pinghui, 5 Million Left Wuhan Before Lockdown, 1,000
New Coronavirus Cases Expected in City, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Jan. 26,
2020), https://www.scmp.com/print/news/china/society/article/3047720/chinesepremier-li-keqiang-head-coronavirus-crisis-team-outbreak
[https://perma.cc/8B5U-XGB6]. The WHO’s report on China’s coronavirus also
notes that five million people left Wuhan during the outbreak. See Report of the
WHO-China Joint Mission on Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19), WORLD
HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO] (Feb. 28, 2020),
https://www.who.int/publications-detail/report-of-the-who-china-joint-missionon-coronavirus-disease-2019-(covid-19) [https://perma.cc/XXU7-T7MX].
8
Id.
9
Phoebe Zhang, Stranded, Quarantined, Doxxed: How Coronavirus Made
Pariahs of Those Who Left Wuhan, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Feb. 4, 2020),
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/3048781/stranded-quarantineddoxxed-how-coronavirus-made-pariahs-those [https://perma.cc/9HTY-XYFP].
10
DONOSO CORTÉS, ESSAYS ON CATHOLICISM, LIBERALISM AND SOCIALISM,
CONSIDERED IN THEIR FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES 174–175 (William M’Donald
trans., 1879); CARL SCHMITT, THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL 69–70 (George
Schwab trans., 2007) (1932).
11
See, e.g., Mo Jihong (莫纪宏), Kangyi Douzheng shi Zhidu Youshi Zuizhijie de
Zhengming (抗疫斗争是制度优势最直接的证明) [The Fight Against the
Epidemic is the Most Direct Proof of the Advantages of the System], AI SIXIANG
(May 21, 2020), http://www.aisixiang.com/data/121579.html
[https://perma.cc/5FXX-SD9U] (commending the advantages of China’s
governance system in light of its coronavirus response).
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explicitly frames its successes as a consequence of CCP leadership.12
China’s state-run media has described the Chinese government’s
response to the pandemic as a “highly organized” war-like
mobilization of national resources.13 Conservative voices in Chinese
media have contrasted this undertaking with “Western…values of
liberalism,” which prevented Western countries from adopting
efficient public health measures in order to contain the pandemic in
time.14
Such critique notwithstanding, it would be a mistake to argue
that the Chinese approach to the coronavirus pandemic amounts to a
negation of rights and legal processes. Appeals to legality have
played a role in the Chinese government’s effort to contain the
pandemic. President Xi Jinping himself has called for the “strict
enforcement of law on prevention and control of infectious
diseases.”15 Such statements demonstrate that CCP leadership seeks
to take advantage of legal processes, even if the justifications for
doing so are not the same as in the liberal narratives on governance. 16
Adding another layer of nuance to the Chinese government’s
approach, the Chinese Supreme People’s Court’s has given much
play to pragmatic aspects of Chinese legal thought in its coronavirus
response. Among other things, the Supreme People’s Court promotes
the settlement of legal disputes so that businesses affected by the

12

P.R.C. STATE COUNCIL, FIGHTING COVID-19: CHINA IN ACTION (June 2020),
http://english.scio.gov.cn/whitepapers/2020-06/07/content_76135269.htm
[https://perma.cc/3QC5-L3NV]. For a Chinese scholar outlining this argument as
a response to the liberal narrative on the pandemic, see Zhao, supra note 1.
13
Fighting Coronavirus is a People's War, GLOB. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2020),
https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1178655.shtml [https://perma.cc/79SNUUAL].
14
Community Grid System Helps China Fight Virus, GLOB. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2020),
https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1178528.shtml [https://perma.cc/AL2XRJKS]. For a discussion on similar views in the Chinese blogosphere, see Jordan
Schneider, Chinese Commentary: “COVID-19 May Ravage America, But It
Won’t Dent American Self-Confidence”, CHINATALK (Apr. 8, 2020),
https://chinatalk.substack.com/p/chinese-commentary-covid-19-may-ravage
[https://perma.cc/B6UX-9RYJ].
15
Xi Stresses Law-based Infection Prevention, Control, XINHUA (Feb. 5, 2020),
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-02/05/c_138758520.htm
[https://perma.cc/669H-82GD].
16
See generally, Taisu Zhang & Tom Ginsburg, China’s Turn Toward Law, 59
VA. J. INT’L L. 307 (2019) (discussing China’s turn towards legality).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol16/iss1/3

30

U. PA. ASIAN L. REV.

[Vol. 16

pandemic will not go under due to short-term liquidity problems.17
In line with similar restrictions adopted through legislation in other
countries, this approach places limits on the enforcement of rights of
creditors and landlords during the pandemic. 18
Extra-legal measures also remain a governance tool for the
Party. The CCP leadership describes its governance methods in terms
of direct action, which is capable of cutting through “formalism” and
“bureaucratism.” 19 As a reflection of the Party leadership’s
ambiguous commitment to legality in the present pandemic, some of
the most extreme public health measures taken by some local Chinese
governments allegedly have no basis in Chinese law. 20 Finally, it is
17

See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Yanjiushi Fuze Ren jiu Chutai Yifa Tuoshan Shenli
she Xinguan Feiyan Yiqing Minshi Anjian Ruogan Wenti de Zhidao Yijian (Yi):
Da Jizhe Wen (最高人民法院研究室负责人就出台依法妥善审理涉新冠肺炎
疫情民事案件若干问题的指导意见（一）: 答记者问) [Supreme People’s
Court Research Office Issues Guidance on the New Coronavirus Epidemic—
Answering Reporters’ Questions], SUP. PEOPLE’S CT., (Apr. 20, 2020),
http://www.court.gov.cn/zixun-xiangqing-226251.html [https://perma.cc/RZ5C9L5G] (discussing the SPC’s guidance on the coronavirus pandemic).
18
For legislation in other countries, see, for example, Coronavirus Aid, Relief,
and Economic Security Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, 134 Stat. 281 (2020),
https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/748
[https://perma.cc/Y9P9-43W9] (providing bankruptcy relief for small business
debtors and imposing a temporary moratorium on eviction filings); Coronavirus
Act 2020, c. 7, § 81, sch. 29 (Gr. Brit.),
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2020/7/schedule/29
[https://perma.cc/ZL4H-4R2W] (adopting measures to protect residential tenants
from evictions in England and Wales).
19
See generally Wang Zihui (王子晖), Liang Ci Zhongyao Huiyi, Xi Jinping
Zhesange Yaoqiu Yiyiguanzhi (两次重要会议，习近平这三个要求一以贯之)
[Two Important Meetings, Xi Jinping’s Three Consistent Requirements], XINHUA
(Feb. 4, 2020), http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/xxjxs/202002/04/c_1125530611.htm [https://perma.cc/RX63-SZDU] (reporting on General
Secretary Xi Jinping’s “stark warning” to the supporters of formalism and
bureaucratism). In Party ideology, formalism and bureaucratism are distinct from
legality. See text accompanying infra notes 165-169.
20
See Shen Kui (沈岿), Dayi Zhixia Shandai Mei yige Ren de Jiben Quanli (大疫
之下善待每一个人的基本权利) [Respect Each Person’s Basic Rights Under a
Great Epidemic], WECHAT PKUPUBLICLAW (Feb. 17, 2020),
https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/FSqrvCo9SkEEfG1apkeE6A [https://perma.cc/587YXBG5] (arguing that some measures taken by the Chinese local governments
potentially infringe upon people’s constitutional rights, such as the right of
personal dignity, the right to adequate housing, and the right to privacy); Tong
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noteworthy that the CCP’s extra-legal discipline inspection organs
have set out to strengthen the ideological controls of Party cadres and
state officials whose responsibility it is to respond to the crisis. 21
Adherence to formal legality is probably not a high priority in this
effort.22
The ideological narratives described in this Article provide a
convenient structure for legitimizing and criticizing government
responses to the coronavirus pandemic. In these narratives China and
liberal democracies appear as points of contrast through which the
promoters of the narratives describe themselves. Much of this
ideological Othering highlights the idiosyncratic aspects and endemic
weaknesses of the opposing ideological outlook. From the illiberal
perspective promoters of liberal narratives on governance and public
health can be said to focus too much on procedural legitimacy; and
consequently, they appear to be ill-placed to acknowledge and
respond to public health emergencies. Conversely, from the liberal
perspective advocates of illiberal narratives on governance and public
health appear to be responding to a never-ending emergency situation;
consequently, they are unable to take full advantage of procedural
Zhiwei (童之伟), Zai Fazhi Guidao Shang Huajie Gonggong Weisheng Weiji (在
法治轨道上化解公共卫生危机) [Resolve the Public Health Crisis on the Tracks
of the Rule of Law], AI SIXIANG (Mar. 2, 2020),
http://www.aisixiang.com/data/120415.html [https://perma.cc/Z2WS-V35R]
(noting that some extreme measures taken by the Chinese local governments lack
a legal basis and interfere with people’s legal rights).
21
See Zhongyang Jiwei Guojia Jianwei Dui Guanche Dang Zhongyang Bushu
Yaoqiu, Zuo Hao Xinxing Guanzhuang Bingdu Ganran Feiyan Yiqing Fangkong
Jiandu Gongzuo Fachu Tongzhi (中央纪委国家监委对贯彻党中央部署要求、
做好新型冠状病毒感染肺炎疫情防控监督工作发出通知 ) [Central
Commission for Discipline Inspection and National Supervision Commission
Issues a Notice on Implementing the Requirements of the CCP Central Committee
on the Prevention and Control of the Novel Coronavirus Pneumonia], CENT.
COMM’N FOR DISCIPLINE INSPECTION (Jan. 30, 2020),
http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/toutiao/202001/t20200130_210462.html
[https://perma.cc/6543-67FP] [hereinafter CCDI] (describing the CCDI’s
disciplinary requirements during the pandemic).
22
See generally Jacques Delisle, The Rule of Law with Xi-Era Characteristics:
Law for Economic Reform, Anticorruption, and Illiberal Politics, 20 ASIA POL’Y
23 (2015) (discussing the thin conception of legality and the rule of law). See
also BRIAN TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY 92–
93 (2004) (explaining how rule by law essentially collapses into rule by the
government).
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legitimacy and rule-based governance in order to prevent public
health emergencies from occurring. These ideological narratives may
not be the only way, or even the principal way, for conceptualizing
governance responses to the pandemic, but neither are they without
any social effects. Among other things, the narratives explain why
an individual sacrifice in the face of a public health emergency is just.
This may be because the individual is presumed to have consented to
the laws on which coercive measures are based, or it may be because
the governing political movement—in China, the CCP—is presumed
to represent everybody’s interests, including the interests of those
people who are subject to coercive measures. 23
Adopting an external perspective to both liberal and illiberal
ideological narratives, this Article argues that the coronavirus
pandemic exposes aspirational qualities of both these narratives. On
one hand, the similarity between the coercive methods adopted in
liberal and illiberal political regimes makes the liberal justification
for public health measures seem aspirational, or outright fictitious.
While various rights claims can be relevant for decision-making
about public health measures,24 seeking to generate a coherent policy
response on the basis of liberal first principles, such as individual
freedom and autonomy, seems aspirational at best. In particular, it is
by no means clear that the human rights-based approach provides a
coherent policy framework for the coronavirus response.25 On the
other hand, the image of a strong, stable government projected by the
CCP also seems aspirational in light of the pandemic. 26 The
precarious nature of the Party’s governance project is highlighted by
the Party leaders’ ambivalent approach to formal rights and legal
processes.
Formal rights and legal processes would allow
inconvenient but important information to circulate freely, but such
rights and processes could also open the floodgates for politically
subversive speech, which could destabilize the regime. 27
23

See infra text accompanying notes 106, 288–29.
Samuli Seppänen, From Substance to Absence: Argumentative Strategies in the
Implementation of the Human Rights-Based Approaches to Development, 49
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 389, 440 (2017).
25
See infra text accompanying notes 96–98.
26
For this projection, see P.R.C. STATE COUNCIL, supra note 12 (referring to “the
strong leadership of the [CCP] Central Committee”).
27
See infra text accompanying notes 127–128, 171 (discussing the CCP’s
conflicting ideologies towards the rule of law).
24
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The remaining parts of this Article are organized as follows.
Part II describes the conventional approach to the relationship
between health and human rights. Part III focuses on the human
rights-based approach to health. Part IV examines intellectual
criticisms against the liberal narratives on public health. Part V
describes illiberal narratives on public health through China’s
response to the coronavirus outbreak. Part VI brings the liberal and
illiberal narratives together and examines their aspirational qualities
and endemic weaknesses. Part VII concludes.

II.

LIBERAL NARRATIVES ON PUBLIC HEALTH: THE
CONVENTIONAL APPROACH

At the highest level of abstraction, liberal narratives justify
public health policies through principles such as individual freedom
and respect for human agency, autonomy, and dignity. 28 The
provision of available and accessible healthcare services, for instance,
must allow people to live “a life in dignity.” 29 Restrictive public
health measures, such as the isolation of infected patients and the
quarantining of potentially infected people, must facilitate maximum
space for individual freedom and respect personal dignity. 30 Such
measures can be said to be necessary only so far as they protect the
freedom and human agency of others, and they are legitimate if and
when they are based on democratically agreed laws.31
28

See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 53, 513 (1999) (describing the first
principle of his theory of justice as the equal right of each person to the most
extensive scheme of basic liberties compatible with similar schemes for others,
and arguing that equal respect for people manifests in treating them justly); Mark
Tushnet, The Possibility of Illiberal Constitutionalism?, 69 FLA. L. REV. 1367,
1368–69 (2017) (defining liberal constitutionalism through the principles of “the
equality of all citizens” and “the priority of the right over the good”); Jeremy
Waldron, Theoretical Foundations of Liberalism, 37 PHIL. Q. 127, 128 (1987)
(defining liberalism as a “commit[ment] to a conception of freedom and of
respect for the capacities and the agency of individual men and women”).
29
See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights
[CESCR], Gen. Comment No. 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard
of Physical and Mental Health (Art. 12), ¶ 42, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4, ¶ 1
(Aug. 11, 2000) (stating that “[e]very human being is entitled to the enjoyment of
the highest attainable standard of health conducive to living a life in dignity”).
30
Shen, supra note 20.
31
Waldron, supra note 28, at 133; SIRACUSA PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, ¶ 34.
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The relationship between rights and public health can be
conceived in different ways within this general conceptual
framework. As mentioned in the Introduction, public health
objectives have been conventionally thought to exist in a potential
conflict with human rights.32 The conventional approach is enshrined,
for instance, in the Siracusa Principles, which pit human rights
against public health objectives. 33 According to the Siracusa
Principles, “[p]ublic health may be invoked as a ground for limiting
certain rights in order to allow a state to take measures dealing with
a serious threat to . . . health . . . . ”34 Restrictions on rights must be
provided for by the law, and they must be applied in a non-arbitrary
and non-discriminatory manner. 35 They must also be necessary,
pursue a legitimate aim, be proportional to their aim, and constitute
the least restrictive means available.36 Some rights and principles,
such as the principle of non-discrimination, the right to life and the
freedom from torture, are non-derogable.37 The Siracusa Principles
also call for “[a]dequate safeguards and effective remedies . . . against
illegal or abusive imposition or application of limitations on human
rights.” 38 A similar approach to conceptualizing the relationship
between health and human rights is apparent in the 2005 International
Health Regulations (IHR), which govern international processes for
preventing the spread of communicable diseases, such as the
coronavirus.39 In addition to including a general statement about the
“respect for the dignity, human rights and fundamental freedoms of
persons” in the implementation of the regulations, the IHR provides
that states “shall treat travelers with respect for their dignity, human
32

At the same time, the conventional approach does not recognize a trade-off
between individual freedom and dignity and public health. It allows rights
restrictions “solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the
rights and freedoms of others . . . in a democratic society.” G.A. Res. 217 A (III),
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 29(2) (Dec. 10, 1948).
33
See generally SIRACUSA PRINCIPLES, supra note 3.
34
SIRACUSA PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, ¶ 25.
35
Id. ¶¶ 5, 7, 9.
36
Id. ¶¶ 10, 11.
37
Id. ¶¶ 9, 58.
38
Id. ¶ 18.
39
WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO], INTERNATIONAL HEALTH
REGULATIONS (2nd ed. 2005),
https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/43883/9789241580410_eng.pdf?
sequence=1 [https://perma.cc/4WJ4-RQCR].
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rights and fundamental freedoms and minimize any discomfort or
distress associated with such measures . . . . ” 40
This vocabulary allows one to make normative assessments
about public health measures adopted in the present coronavirus
pandemic. The cordoning off of entire cities, 41 the monitoring of
people’s movement through mandatory mobile phone applications, 42
and the isolation of infected patients in clinics with access to adequate
healthcare services can be said to satisfy the Siracusa Principles—or
not, depending on how one weights the scales of justice. Some
government measures may fall short of the test set out in Siracusa
Principles because less restrictive and more efficient public health
measures would have been available for the authorities. 43 For
instance, the policy in China’s Zhejiang province to allow only one
person from a household to leave their home every two days would
be compared unfavorably to equally effective, but more lenient
measures adopted elsewhere in the world. 44 Other government
measures may fail the Siracusa Principles’ test because they do not
yield positive health outcomes. 45 For example, the practice in
Zhejiang province to prevent people who visited heavily affected
40

Id. at art. 3, 32.
Zunyou Wu & Jennifer McGoogan, Characteristics of and Important Lessons
from the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Outbreak in China: Summary of
a Report of 72,314 Cases from the Chinese Center for Disease Control and
Prevention, 323(13) JAMA 1239–1242, (Feb. 24, 2020),
doi:10.1001/jama.2020.2648.
42
Minghe Hu, Beijing Rolls Out Colour-coded QR System for Coronavirus
Tracking Despite Concerns Over Privacy, Inaccurate Ratings, S. CHINA
MORNING POST (Mar. 2, 2020), https://www.scmp.com/tech/appssocial/article/3064574/beijing-rolls-out-colour-coded-qr-system-coronavirustracking [https://perma.cc/4X98-EHNQ].
43
Compare Viola Zhou, Coronavirus: Zhejiang Adopts Draconian Quarantine
Measures to Fight Disease, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Feb. 6, 2020),
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/3049298/coronavirus-zhejiangadopts-draconian-quarantine-measures-fight (describing local quarantine
measures in China), with Richard Pérez-Peña, Virus Hits Europe Harder than
China. Is that the Price of an Open Society?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/19/world/europe/europe-chinacoronavirus.html?referringSource=articleShare [https://perma.cc/UH78-43TW]
(explaining how Singapore and South Korea used “aggressive testing and contacttracing to stop the chain of transmission, without shutting down economic
activity”).
44
Id.
45
See Shen, supra note 20, for such a practice in the Zhejiang Province of China.
41
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areas from returning to their homes led people to shelter with relatives
or in hotels, potentially spreading the virus further. 46
The concept of discrimination in the Siracusa Principles is
partly tied to a determination about what counts as a successful public
health intervention. 47 The forced evictions of specific groups of
Chinese and foreign nationals, such as Nigerian people in Guangzhou,
from their homes served no legitimate public health purpose and
could, therefore, be seen as discriminatory under the Siracusa
Principles.48 Under the conventional approach, it is also possible to
think of a situation where public health measures are considered
discriminatory even if their effect on public health is neutral or
positive. This would be the case with a provision of otherwise
appropriate and necessary health services (say, a coronavirus
vaccination program) in a discriminatory or stigmatizing manner. 49
46

Id.
See UNAIDS, RIGHTS IN THE TIME OF COVID-19: LESSONS FROM HIV FOR AN
EFFECTIVE, COMMUNITY-LED RESPONSE 5 (2020),
https://www.unaids.org/sites/default/files/media_asset/human-rights-and-covid19_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/X7UH-7QPJ] (stating that a key lesson from the HIV
pandemic is that the discrimination of different groups of people must be avoided
in the design of effective public health measures); U.N. HUM. RTS. OFF. OF HIGH
COMM’R, RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN THE CONTEXT OF THE COVID-19 CRISIS 2
(2020), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Racism/COVID19_and_Racial_Discrimination.pdf [https://perma.cc/JE9H-2WMY] (emphasizing
the need for the respect of human rights and the avoidance of discrimination);
Delan Devakumar et al., Racism and Discrimination in COVID-19 Responses,
395 LANCET 1194 (2020), https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(20)30792-3 [
http://perma.cc/292J-PD3B] (explaining how a health system can only be strong if
there is social inclusion).
48
See supra text accompanying note 9 and Vivian Wang & Amy Qin, As
Coronavirus Fades in China, Nationalism and Xenophobia Flare, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 16, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/16/world/asia/coronaviruschina-nationalism.html [https://perma.cc/A8HG-3DH3] (describing how African
residents of Guangzhou reported being evicted from their homes after only a few
tested positive for coronavirus).
49
See UNAIDS, supra note 47, at 8 (explaining that certain phrases and
associations should be avoided when describing how the virus is transmitted);
Wang & Qin, supra note 48 (discussing how China’s approach to controlling the
virus has led to patriotism, nationalism, and xenophobia); Addressing Human
Rights as Key to the COVID-19 Response, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION
[WHO] (Apr. 21, 2020),
https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/331811/WHO-2019-nCoV-SRHRights-2020.1-eng.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y [http://perma.cc/Y2VT-V8U9]
(contending that public health emergencies often lead to discrimination against

47
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The Siracusa Principles also require that “adequate safeguards and
effective remedies” be in place against illegal and abusive rights
restrictions.50 Finally, public health measures that have no basis in
law fall short of the Siracusa Principles. For instance, Chinese
scholars have argued that city-wide lockdowns adopted in the
beginning of the coronavirus pandemic violated Chinese laws. 51
Even the Chinese Supreme People’s Court chastised local authorities
for adopting unlawful measures to suppress information about the
outbreak.52

certain groups or affected persons). See also U.N. HUM. RTS. OFF. OF HIGH
COMM’R, supra note 47, at 3 (emphasizing that there is no place for any form of
discrimination while responding to coronavirus).
50
SIRACUSA PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, ¶ 18. For a discussion of the context of
this question, see Elaine Yu et al., Wuhan Rounds Up the Infected as Death Toll
in China Jumps, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/06/world/asia/coronavirus-china.html
[https://perma.cc/MQ8X-5VJ7].
51
See Zhiqiong June Wang, Law in Crisis: A Critical Analysis of the Role of Law
in China’s Fight Against COVID-19, GRIFFITH L. REV. 1, 10 (2020) (explaining
how many post-lockdown measures taken without an emergency declaration in
parts of China were legally problematic under Chinese law); Tong, supra note 20
(characterizing a local government’s order that residents must stay home or face
being detained as illegal under Chinese law); Matthew Walsh, China’s SuperStrict City Lockdowns May Be Illegal, CAIXIN GLOB. (Feb. 18, 2020),
https://www.caixinglobal.com/2020-02-18/chinas-super-strict-city-lockdownsmay-be-illegal-101517249.html [https://perma.cc/SL4N-Q2CU] (citing experts
who say that the ban by authorities in Xiaogan on people leaving their homes may
have been illegal). For a detailed analysis of P.R.C. law relating to the
coronavirus pandemic (in German), see Philipp Renninger, Corona und
Kommunales Krisenmanagement in China—Städtisches Notfall-(Nicht-)Recht zur
Bekämpfung von COVID-19 und Anderen Pandemien am Beispiel Wuhans,
DEUTSCHES VERWALTUNGSBLATT, 739, 745 (2020) (Ger.).
52
Wang, Law in Crisis, supra note 51, at 12–15. For the Supreme People’s
Court’s reaction to the reprimand issued to the coronavirus whistle-blower, Dr. Li
Wenliang, see Tang Xinhua (唐兴华), Zhili Youguan Xinxing Feiyan de Yaoyan
Wenti, Zhe Pian Wenzhang Shuo Qingchu le! (治理有关新型肺炎的谣言问题，
这篇文章说清楚了!) [This Article Clarifies the Question of the Management of
Rumours About the New Pneumonia!], SUP. PEOPLE’S CT. WEIBO (Jan. 28, 2020),
https://www.weibo.com/ttarticle/p/show?id=2309404465698775629865
[http://perma.cc/WGX9-Z9VX] (urging local authorities to disclose necessary
pandemic information to the public).
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LIBERAL NARRATIVES ON PUBLIC HEALTH: THE
HUMAN RIGHTS-BASED APPROACH

The conventional approach to public health and human rights
views human rights as a counterbalance and, in the case of nonderogable rights, as trumps to public health measures. 53 In doing so,
the approach treats public health and human rights as two separate
fields without emphasizing the causal relations between them. This
view on health and human rights was rethought in the 1980s and
1990s, primarily due to another viral outbreak, the HIV/AIDS
epidemic. 54 Rather than conceptualizing human rights and public
health objectives in terms of a conflict and a trade-off, the new
approach saw human rights and public health objectives in mutually
re-enforcing terms.55
The change of perspective was partly motivated by the
specific nature of the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Before effective
treatment became available in the mid-1990s, individuals had few
incentives to be tested for HIV.56 Instead of receiving treatment, a
person who tested positive for HIV could be evicted, expelled from

53

SIRACUSA PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, ¶¶ 58–60. Non-derogable rights include,
inter alia, the right to life, freedom from torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment, and freedom of thought, conscience and religion.
54
See Jonathan M. Mann & Daniel Tarantola, Responding to HIV/AIDS: A
Historical Perspective, 2(4) HEALTH & HUM. RTS. 5, 5–8 (1998) (describing how
initial strategies implemented to combat the HIV/AIDS epidemic shifted to a
human rights-based approach).
55
Id. at 8.
56
See, e.g., GOSTIN & LAZZARINI, supra note 4, at 43 (describing human rights
violations against HIV-positive people early in the pandemic); Daniel Tarantola
& Sofia Gruskin, The Recognition and Evolution of the HIV and Human Rights
Interface: 1981–2017, in RSCH. HANDBOOK ON GLOB. HEALTH L. 303, 309–310
(Gian Luca Burci & Brigit Toebes eds. 2018) (mentioning that public health
measures, including HIV prevention, in the 1990s could infringe on civil and
political rights). The change of perspective in public health occurred at a time
when the role of human rights was reconceptualized in development policies more
generally. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL OF AUSTRALIA, THE RIGHTS
WAY TO DEVELOPMENT: A HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACH TO DEVELOPMENT
ASSISTANCE: POLICY AND PRACTICE (2001) (outlining new steps to apply a human
rights-based approach to development); AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS
FREEDOM (1999) (commenting on changes in the discussion of human rights and
development in the 1990s).
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schools and fired from their jobs. 57 Consequently, many people
chose to remain untested and thus unaware of their HIV-positive
status, continuing risk behavior. 58 Under the new rights-based
approach eliminating discrimination against HIV-positive people was
understood “as central to the global AIDS challenge as the disease
itself.”59 Improving the rights of HIV-positive people (through, for
instance, legal challenges to discrimination and the extensive
application of disability legislation) reduced the social and economic
costs of a positive HIV-test result for an individual, which further
encouraged testing and ultimately decreased risk behavior. 60
The new insight about the interrelatedness of health and
human rights expanded from the field of HIV/AIDS to other fields of
public health. According to the new human rights-based approach to
health, human rights provided “public health with a coherent
framework for analyzing and responding to the societal dimension of
health.”61 Promoters of the new approach argued, and continue to
argue, that public health measures not only contribute to the
attainment of social and economic rights, and most obviously to the
right to health, but that they also improve the implementation of civil
and political rights and the principle of non-discrimination. 62 All
human rights—social, economic, and cultural, as well as civil and
political—contribute to the aim of promoting individual freedom and
respect for human agency. 63 At the same time, promoters of the
rights-based approaches also presume that improving human rights
57

Id.
See Mann & Tarantola, supra note 54, at 6–7 (mentioning that many HIVpositive people in vulnerable population groups could not access prevention
services due to, in part, social discrimination).
59
Jonathan M. Mann, Statement at an Informal Briefing on AIDS to the 42nd
Session of the United Nations General Assembly, WORLD HEALTH
ORGANIZATION [WHO] 1 (Oct. 20, 1987),
https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/61546/WHO_SPA_INF_87.12.p
df?sequence=1&isAllowed=y [http://perma.cc/4L3W-FR27].
60
See George J. Annas, The Impact of Health Policies on Human Rights: AIDS
and TB Control, in HEALTH & HUM. RTS.: A READER 37, 37–40, 43 (Jonathan
Mann et al. eds., 1999) (detailing legal challenges to United States policy toward
HIV-positive immigrants).
61
S. Gruskin, J. Mann & D. Tarantola, Past, Present, and Future: AIDS and
Human Rights, 2(4) HEALTH & HUM. RTS. 1, 2–3 (1998); Tarantola & Gruskin,
supra note 56, at 313–314.
62
CESCR, supra note 29, ¶ 3.
63
SEN, supra note 56, at xi–xiii.
58
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conditions contributes to the achievement of public health goals. 64
This is the case even with civil and political rights. The human rightsbased approach to health teaches, for instance, that allowing civil
society groups to operate freely enables them to advocate for various
health-related rights and thus improve public health conditions. 65
As is the case with other liberal narratives, in the human
rights-based approach “the process is critical.” 66 Human rights need
to be “integrated into every component of a project and every step of
the process.” 67 The very meaning of health and other interrelated
concepts, such as discrimination and human dignity, needs to be
determined in a procedurally fair, human-rights-based process. 68
This is not only a normative argument about rights but also a
consequentialist argument about health. Promoters of the rightsbased approaches argue that in the long run, public health policies
and programs formulated in a liberal democratic process are more
responsive, legitimate and effective than policies and programs that
are handed down by authoritarian governments.69
Arguments about the interrelatedness of health and human
rights have appeared in much commentary on the ongoing
coronavirus pandemic. As mentioned above, commentators in North
America and Europe have suggested that the illiberal nature of
China’s one-party state enabled and encouraged Chinese officials to
suppress information about the outbreak in its early stages, thereby
worsening the pandemic.70 Some outspoken liberal-minded Chinese
64

WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO], 25 QUESTIONS & ANSWERS ON
HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS 20–21, (July 2002),
https://www.who.int/hhr/information/25%20Questions%20and%20Answers%20o
n%20Health%20and%20Human%20Rights.pdf [https://perma.cc/9TN2-ZFRN].
65
See supra note 4.
66
See Sofia Gruskin, Dina Bogecho & Laura Ferguson, ‘Rights-based
Approaches’ to Health Policies and Programs: Articulations, Ambiguities, and
Assessment, 31 J. PUB. HEALTH POL’Y 129, 139 (2010).
67
Id.
68
See Alicia Ely Yamin, Shades of Dignity: Exploring the Demands of Equality in
Applying Human Rights Frameworks to Health, 11 HEALTH AND HUM. RTS. 1, 13
(2009) (arguing that, without a fair method of implementation, human rightsbased concepts would cease to be meaningful).
69
See generally PAUL FARMER, PATHOLOGIES OF POWER: HEALTH, HUMAN
RIGHTS, AND THE NEW WAR ON THE POOR (2004) (discussing international
responses to public health crises).
70
Kavanagh, supra note 1; Steven Lee Myers & Chris Buckley, In Coronavirus, a
‘Battle’ That Could Humble China’s Strongman, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2020,
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scholars, such as Professor He Weifang of Peking University Law
School, have also made the connection between liberal freedoms and
public health in their public statements. He Weifang has pointed out
that the central government in Beijing knew about the epidemic
several weeks before they announced it and took measures against
it.71 “Without press freedom,” He Weifang concludes, “people will
live in distress and the government in mendacity.”72 A similar belief
is shared by the hundreds of Chinese academics who signed a petition
in the early stages of the pandemic, calling, among other things, for
the freedom of expression in China. 73 Xu Zhangrun, a politically
liberal law professor, who was subsequently dismissed from his
position at Tsinghua University, has expanded the argument to the
systemic level. 74 In Xu’s view, China’s illiberal political system,
enabled “dangerous ‘systemic impotence’ at every level.” 75 Other
critics of the Chinese government’s response have argued that the
absence of a functioning civil society in China hampered the
government’s efforts in the pandemic.76
updated Feb. 10, 2020); https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/26/world/asia/chinacoronavirus-xi-jinping.html [https://perma.cc/9BXG-83E6].
71
Jun Mai & Mimi Lau, Chinese Scholar Blames Xi Jinping, Communist Party
for Not Controlling Coronavirus Outbreak, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Feb. 6,
2020), https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3049233/chinesescholar-blames-xi-jinping-communist-party-not [https://perma.cc/WAY9-45X7].
72
Cai, supra note 6.
73
Mimi Lau, Echo Xie & Guo Rui, Coronavirus: Li Wenliang’s Death Prompts
Academics to Challenge Beijing on Freedom of Speech, S. CHINA MORNING POST
(Feb. 12, 2020),
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3050086/coronavirushundreds-chinese-sign-petition-calling-freedom [https://perma.cc/Q2Q4-2X6D].
74
For background on Xu Zhangrun, see Geremie R. Barmé, Xu Zhangrun
Archive, CHINA HERITAGE (Apr. 16, 2019), http://chinaheritage.net/xu-zhangrun許章潤 [https://perma.cc/6FUU-H4Y4]. For news about his dismissal, see Guo
Rui, China Leadership Critic Xu Zhangrun Sacked One Day After Release,
Friends Say, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Jul. 14, 2020),
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3093119/china-leadershipcritic-xu-zhangrun-sacked-one-day-after [https://perma.cc/N46T-XN89].
75
Xu Zhangrun , Viral Alarm: When Fury Overcomes Fear, CHINAFILE (Geremie
R. Barmé trans., Feb. 10, 2020), https://www.chinafile.com/reportingopinion/viewpoint/viral-alarm-when-fury-overcomes-fear [https://perma.cc/R97SGSP8].
76
Li Yuan, In Coronavirus Fight, China Sidelines an Ally: Its Own People, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 19, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/18/business/chinacoronavirus-charity-supplies.html [https://perma.cc/4ASR-VW4J].
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The emphasis on civil and political rights is particularly
prominent in the commentary on China’s coronavirus response. 77
Outside the Chinese context, much of the rights-based commentary
focuses on social and economic rights. 78 As is the case with past
epidemics, the coronavirus pandemic has affected vulnerable groups
with low socioeconomic status disproportionally. 79 People in lower
socio-economic groups have been most adversely economically
affected by both lockdowns and workplace infections.80 Measures
against the pandemic have impaired equal access to education. 81 It
has been easier for governments to impose rights restrictions that
most affect already disadvantaged and vulnerable groups. 82 The
argument that inadequate protection of human rights is harming the
public health response has also been raised in the present pandemic.
In the United States, employees who cannot afford to take sick days
due to poor employment protection and access to social and health

77

But see U.N. HUM. RTS. OFF. OF HIGH COMM’R, supra note 47, at 3 (discussing
widespread racial discrimination and civil rights violations globally); UNAIDS,
supra note 47, at 6–7 (discussing the relevance of democracy and freedom of
speech for coronavirus measures globally).
78
See, e.g., WHO, supra note 47, at 1–2 (describing the worsening health and
economic conditions of individuals with unstable economic conditions as a result
of the coronavirus pandemic). For previous pandemics, see Svenn-Erik
Mamelund et al., The Association Between Socioeconomic Status and Pandemic
Influenza: Protocol for a Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, SYSTEMATIC
REV. 2 (Jan. 4, 2019),
https://systematicreviewsjournal.biomedcentral.com/track/pdf/10.1186/s13643018-0931-2 [https://perma.cc/G4VG-C695] (associating socioeconomic risk
factors with pandemic outcomes).
79
Id.
80
Geoffrey Anderson et al, Using Socioeconomics to Counter Health Disparities
Arising from the Covid-19 Pandemic, 369 BRIT. MED. J. 1, 3–4 (June 8, 2020),
https://www.bmj.com/content/369/bmj.m2149 [https://perma.cc/S3VS-NVD9].
81
See Statement on COVID-19 and Youth, United Nations Inter-agency Network
on Youth Development, ¶ 7 (2020),
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Youth/COVID-19_and_Youth.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5NEN-DREY] (pointing out that underprivileged youth often
lack access to remote learning tools); U.N. HUM. RTS. OFF. OF HIGH COMM’R,
supra note 47, at 4 (discussing widespread school closures globally).
82
See U.N. HUM. RTS. OFF. OF HIGH COMM’R, supra note 47, at 7 (discussing the
disparate impact of coronavirus on individuals in precarious employment
situations).
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services are more likely to contract and spread the disease. 83 Denying
paperless immigrants access to healthcare and other services has a
similar effect. 84 The rights-based approach to health, therefore,
suggests that there is ultimately no trade-off between human rights
and the containment of the coronavirus pandemic—what is good for
human rights is good for public health.85

IV.

QUESTIONING LIBERAL NARRATIVES

The Chinese government has adopted some elements of the
above-described liberal narratives on the coronavirus pandemic. In
83

See, e.g., Max Fisher & Emma Bubola, As Coronavirus Deepens Inequality,
Inequality Worsens Its Spread, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 15, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/15/world/europe/coronavirus-inequality.html
[https://perma.cc/F4QK-LX7D] (describing the economic conditions of lowincome workers and the increased likelihood of contracting Covid-19 during the
current pandemic); Faheem Ahmed et al., Comment, Why Inequality Could
Spread COVID-19, 5(5) E240 LANCET PUB. HEALTH (Apr. 2, 2020),
https://doi.org/10.1016/S2468-2667(20)30085-2 [https://perma.cc/Y2A9RQWW] (explaining the effects of the coronavirus pandemic on poor population
groups).
84
See Portugal to Treat Migrants as Residents During Coronavirus Crisis,
REUTERS (Mar. 28, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirusportugal/portugal-to-treat-migrants-as-residents-during-coronavirus-crisisidUSKBN21F0N7 [https://perma.cc/65QV-9FGW] (explaining the rationale for
granting permanent status to foreigners with pending applications); Miriam
Jordan, We’re Petrified’: Immigrants Afraid to Seek Medical Care for
Coronavirus, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/18/us/coronavirus-immigrants.html
[https://perma.cc/6D6B-MTR6] (describing undocumented immigrants’ fear of
seeking medical attention with potential coronavirus symptoms).
85
International organizations employ both the conventional and the more holistic
rights-based narrative in their commentary on the pandemic. The WHO Director
General has stated that “[a]ll countries must strike a fine balance between
protecting health . . . and respecting human rights.” Tedros Adhanom
Ghebreyesus, WHO Director-General’s Opening Remarks at the Media Briefing
on COVID-19–11 March 2020, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO] (Mar.
11, 2020), https://www.who.int/dg/speeches/detail/who-director-general-sopening-remarks-at-the-media-briefing-on-covid-19–-11-march-2020
[https://perma.cc/9TCP-GDDN]. WHO’s policy paper on human rights and the
coronavirus pandemic, in contrast, stresses the holistic rights-based approach to
health, stating that “[h]uman rights frameworks provide a crucial structure that
can strengthen the effectiveness of global efforts to address the pandemic.”
WHO, supra note 49, at 1.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol16/iss1/3

44

U. PA. ASIAN L. REV.

[Vol. 16

addition to seeking to protect the employment rights of coronavirus
patients, the government has denounced the local authorities’ initial
suppression of information about the outbreak. 86 Nevertheless, the
overall message of the P.R.C. government has been that China’s oneparty state has been crucial for tackling the pandemic.87
Before discussing the Chinese government’s perspective to
the pandemic, it may be helpful to note that the above-described
liberal assumptions about public health have been contested outside
China as well. This criticism takes many forms, but most
fundamentally, it proposes that the liberal project to justify social
arrangements through the liberal first principles must fail. 88 In reality,
it may be argued, liberal narratives exist to provide a layer of
ideological gloss for political decisions that do not follow from the
above-described first principles of liberalism.89 Depending on who
is speaking, the quarantining of cities, regions, and countries may be
deemed disproportionate and excessive–or these measures may be
accepted as proportionate and the least restrictive measures available,
considering the available resources and information. It is not the
philosophical premises of liberalism that determine the use and
acceptability of these measures, but something else altogether: the
political culture of a given country, the competence and sensibilities
of decision-makers, the resources available to public health
authorities, the risk tolerance of decision-makers and citizens, and so
forth. The same argument can be extended to the efficacy of public
86

See SUP. PEOPLE’S CT., supra note 17; SUP. PEOPLE’S CT., supra note 52. See
also Li Yuan, Coronavirus Crisis Exposes Cracks in China’s Facade of Unity,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/28/business/chinacoronavirus-communist-party.html [https://perma.cc/H7Z4-VA2Z]; Steven Lee
Myers, Xi Goes to Wuhan, Coronavirus Epicenter, in Show of Confidence, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 10, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/10/world/asia/coronavirus-china-xijinping.html [https://perma.cc/P5HJ-BJMU]; Probe Findings on Li Wenliang
Mark Start of Reflection, Holding Accountability, GLOB. TIMES (Mar. 20, 2020),
https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1183211.shtml [https://perma.cc/8CJP-Z6U5]
(discussing the central Chinese government’s investigation into the suppression of
whistleblower Dr. Li Wenliang).
87
See P.R.C. STATE COUNCIL, supra note 11, and infra text accompanying notes
104–106.
88
See Michael J. Sandel, Political Liberalism, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1767–68
(1994) (reviewing JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993)).
89
See supra text accompanying note 29.
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health measures. The efficiency of public health measures in the
present pandemic has depended on governmental competence, state
capacity and the public’s trust in the state government—not on
whether the government is liberal or not.90 Illiberal regimes may be
competent and capable in certain regards, and at times they may even
enjoy the public’s trust. 91 Relatedly, both liberal and illiberal
governments have failed their citizens in numerous ways in the
coronavirus pandemic.92
From a critical perspective, it also appears that there are few,
if any, self-evident consequences from the respect for individual
freedom and human agency, autonomy and dignity for public health
policies and measures. For instance, a critic may point out that
neither the expansion nor the restriction of the freedom of expression
inevitably leads to better public health outcomes. In fact, liberal
vocabulary is not incompatible with restricting the freedom of
expression in order to achieve public health objectives. Such
restrictions may even justify giving effect to individual agency,
autonomy and human dignity. For instance, European courts have
made health-related commercial speech “conditional upon the
disclosure of sufficient and reliable information to consumers.” 93
The justification for restrictions on such speech is not only the
promotion of public health objectives (and, one may argue, the right
to health) but also the promotion of individual autonomy, which is
contingent on allowing individuals to make decisions on an informed
basis.94 Respect for individual autonomy and human dignity may,
therefore, justify restrictions on the freedom of expression in the field
of public health. Conversely, liberal vocabulary may also be used to
advocate the freedom of expression at the expense of public health
90

Fukuyama, supra note 1.
Id. For instance, Donald Clarke has argued that whatever trust investors may
have in the Chinese government need not be based on formal enforceable rights.
Donald C. Clarke, Economic Development and the Rights Hypothesis: The China
Problem, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 89, 109–111 (2003).
92
See infra note 163.
93
Amandine Garde, Freedom of Commercial Expression and the Public Health
Protection in Europe, 12 CAMBRIDGE Y.B. EUR. LEGAL STUD. 225, 226 (2009–
2010).
94
Id. at 231. See also Lars Noah, Truth or Consequences?: Commercial Free
Speech vs. Public Health Promotion (at the FDA), 21 HEALTH MATRIX 31, 90–92
(2011) (discussing the possibility of the U.S. government restricting truthful
commercial speech for public health reasons).
91
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objectives. This is the case when pharmaceutical companies are
allowed a wide scope of commercial speech, despite the adverse
public health consequences of such speech. 95
Rather than assuming that the human rights-based framework
provides a single coherent policy framework for the coronavirus
response, a critic may argue that rights claims in the coronavirus
pandemic—say, claims about the right to health and the right to
education—are mutually incompatible.96 A critic may also point out
that the human rights-based approach recognizes no hierarchies
between human rights and instead contends that all rights are
interrelated and mutually re-enforcing.97 Such a posture provides no
guidance on how to divide scarce resources in a public health
emergency. The interrelatedness of all human rights has made the
human rights-based approaches analytically fuzzy. It has also made
the advocacy of the human rights-based approaches a difficult task in
the public health community and especially within the WHO. 98

95

See David Orentlicher, The Commercial Speech Doctrine in Health Regulation:
The Clash Between the Public Interest in a Robust First Amendment and the
Public Interest in Effective Protection from Harm, 37 AM. J.L. & MED. 299, 305
(2011) (discussing first amendment challenges against pharmaceutical
promotions); Sarah A. Roache et al., Big Food and Soda Versus Public Health:
Industry Litigation Against Local Government Regulations to Promote Healthy
Diets, 45 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1051, 1079–1083 (2018) (discussing first
amendment challenges against public health warning labels).
96
In the early stages of the pandemic, the United Nations Educational, Scientific
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) outlined several ways in which the
“temporary school closures . . . could threaten the right to education.” According
to UNESCO, the school closures could negatively impact learning achievement,
decrease economic productivity, and compound inequality. Coronavirus Update:
290 Million Students Now Stuck at Home, U.N. NEWS (Mar. 5, 2020),
https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/03/1058791 [https://perma.cc/T5RQ-8CR5].
See also David Kennedy, The International Human Rights Movement: Part of the
Problem?, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 101, 113 (2002) (describing how human rights
can create conflicts).
97
U.N. POP. FUND [UNFPA] & HARVARD SCH. PUB. HEALTH, A HUMAN RIGHTSBASED APPROACH TO PROGRAMMING: PRACTICAL INFORMATION AND TRAINING
MATERIALS 458 (2010).
98
See Helena Nygren-Krug, The Right to Health: From Concept to Practice, in
ADVANCING THE HUMAN RIGHT TO HEALTH 39, 40 (Jose M. Zuniga et al. eds.,
2013) (describing the conflicted ways in which human rights may be postulated);
Seppänen, supra note 24, at 439.
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Finally, a strand of criticism argues that the liberal emphasis
on legal processes is misplaced and unjustified. 99 There are sound
policy reasons for not subjecting all public health policies to judicial
review even in a liberal democracy. On the one hand, it can be argued
that there is no necessary link between the liberal first principles and
the judicial review of public health measures. The Siracusa
Principles, for instance, refrain from calling for the judicial review of
government decisions, being satisfied with “[a]dequate safeguards
and effective remedies” for controlling abuses of power. 100 On the
other hand, it can be argued that the distribution of healthcare
resources is too important a function to be left for the court system to
decide. In jurisdictions where the right to health may be litigated,
legal disputes about this right end up in courts in a more or less
random order, and judges deciding such cases typically have
insufficient resources to do so.101

V.

ILLIBERAL EXCEPTIONALISM

The above-described criticisms do not need to justify illiberal
policies or political systems. Instead, they may be intended to expose
the repressiveness and arbitrariness of liberal ideology in a call for
more authentic human emancipation than what mainstream human
rights language caters for. Nevertheless, these criticisms may also
justify illiberal forms of government. In China, in particular, the
critique of liberal narratives takes a politically meaningful form. 102

99

See Kennedy, The International Human Rights Movement, supra note 96, at
110 (describing the attachment of the human rights movement to legal
machinery).
100
SIRACUSA PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, at 18.
101
See Siri Gloppen, Litigation as a Strategy to Hold Governments Accountable
for Implementing the Right to Health, 10 HEALTH & HUM. RTS., no. 2, 2008, at
21, 24 (noting the casuistic nature of litigation in health promotion). See also
David Landau, The Reality of Social Rights Enforcement, 53 HARV. INT’L L.J.
189, 199–200 (2012) (describing the accrual of benefit to higher social classes
when social rights are enforced in court).
102
For an overview of Chinese critical scholarship, see generally Samuli
Seppänen, Ideological Renewal and Nostalgia in China's “Avant-garde” Legal
Scholarship, 13 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 83 (2014) (discussing three
different strands of contemporary Chinese “avant-garde” legal scholarship). For a
specific text, see JIANG SHIGONG (强世功), LIFAZHE DE FALIXUE (立法者的法理
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Indeed, the ongoing coronavirus pandemic has provided an
opportunity for the Chinese leadership to taunt the superiority of
Chinese-style socialism compared to liberal democracies. “Were it
not for the unique institutional advantages of the Chinese system,”
the China Daily explained (somewhat prematurely) in February 2020,
“the world might be battling a devastating pandemic.” 103
According to Xi Jinping, the Chinese government’s actions in
the coronavirus outbreak “once again demonstrated the notable
advantages of the leadership of the [CCP] and the system of socialism
with Chinese characteristics.”104 In Xi’s view, the CCP was able to
deploy resources swiftly to fight the epidemic under the centralized,
unified leadership of the Party. 105 China’s state-run media has
advanced similar arguments about the benefits of the Chinese
governance model. In liberalism the “state is a ‘necessary evil’ and
its presence must be contained, otherwise it infringes on the rights of
individuals,” whereas in the Chinese political tradition and in
“eastern civilizations . . . the state, the Party and the people have
学) [LEGISLATORS’ JURISPRUDENCE] 10–12 (2007) (arguing that Chinese legal
research should not become the stage of Western ideology).
103
China’s Unprecedented Measures Prevent Novel Coronavirus Infecting the
World, CHINA DAILY (Feb. 20, 2020),
https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202002/20/WS5e4e7a7ca310128217279147.ht
ml [https://perma.cc/628F-F39Z]. See also China’s Propagandists are Trapped
by Their Own Rhetoric, ECONOMIST (Mar. 5, 2020),
https://www.economist.com/china/2020/03/05/chinas-propagandists-are-trappedby-their-own-rhetoric [https://perma.cc/34MY-VAV4] (arguing that the promises
of China’s propagandists can never be realized).
104
Xi Stresses Unremitting Efforts in COVID-19 Control, Coordination on
Economic, Social Development, XINHUA (Feb. 24, 2020),
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-02/24/c_138811372.htm
[https://perma.cc/C8A3-5TP5].
105
Id. For the same argument by a Chinese scholar specializing on Marxism in
the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, see Liu Zhongxun (刘忠勋), Cong
Yiqing Fangkong Kan Woguo Zhidu Youshi he Zhili Xiaoneng (从疫情防控看我
国制度优势和治理效能) [From the Perspective of Epidemic Prevention and
Control: China’s Institutional Advantages and Governance Effectiveness],
CHINESE SOC. SCI. NET (Mar. 13, 2020), http://marx.cssn.cn
[https://perma.cc/875D-UPUG] (attributing the success in controlling the
pandemic to China’s institutional advantages and the leadership of the CCP). See
also P.R.C. STATE COUNCIL, supra note 11 (stating that “[a]fter weathering the
epidemic, the Chinese people have keenly realized that the [CCP] leadership is
the most reliable shelter against storms.”).
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shared interests.” 106 Chinese media has cited the so-called
community grid management system as a specific example of China’s
state-centric and communal approach to public health. 107 This
system makes use of idiosyncratic Chinese governance institutions,
such as neighborhood-level Party committees and their staff members
as well as community-level healthcare providers, in disease
control.108
Yet, instead of extolling the benefits of a Marxist-Leninist
dictatorship, Chinese Party leaders and ideologues often emphasize
more widely appealing aspects of the Party’s governance model, such
as the socialist rule of law principle. 109 This principle not only
comprises the strict obedience to the law, but also values such as
equality before the law and (supposedly “socialist”) notions of formal

106

Community Grid System Helps China Fight Virus, GLOB. TIMES (Feb. 5,
2020), https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1178528.shtml
[https://perma.cc/DPH7-H6ZC].
107
The “grid management system” (网格化管理) [Wanggehua Guanli] is a
scarcely studied aspect of Chinese governance. See Beibei Tang, Grid
Governance in China's Urban Middle-class Neighbourhoods, 241 CHINA Q. 43,
43 (2020) (“[T]he grid governance scheme has become a major vehicle for
resident mobilization . . . to reinforce the Party’s leadership . . . ”); see also
Yongshun Cai, Grid Management and Social Control in China, ASIA DIALOGUE
(Apr. 27, 2018), https://theasiadialogue.com/2018/04/27/grid-management-andsocial-control-in-china/ [https://perma.cc/GXR4-RLDF] (describing the grid
management system as a signal of the “government’s tightened monitoring of
society” in China).
108
See Tang, supra note 107, at 49–50 (describing the role of neighborhood-level
Party committees); Guanyu Jiaqiang Xinxing Guanzhuang Bingdu Ganran de
Feiyan Yiqing Shequ Fangkong Gongzuo de Tongzhi (关于加强新型冠状病毒
感染的肺炎疫情社区防控工作的通知) [Notice on Strengthening Community
Efforts on the Prevention and Control of the Novel Coronavirus Pneumonia
Epidemic] (Jan. 24, 2020), https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/fjBfo6lx_HksDP8_4C8sQ [https://perma.cc/CGZ9-DXMD] (describing the
institutional arrangements for the prevention and control of the pandemic),
translated in CHINA L.TRANSLATE, https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/en/ncovcommunity-measures/ [https://perma.cc/8LXZ-5VYM]. See also P.R.C. STATE
COUNCIL, supra note 11 (describing the Chinese prevention and control system,
which involves all sectors of society).
109
Even the above-cited Global Times article emphasizes that the grid
management system “is not an authoritarian machine.” See GLOB. TIMES,
Community Grid System, supra note 106.
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and substantive justice.110 Texts referring to this ideal allude to the
notion of “Party leadership”, but the meaning of such leadership is
seldom fleshed out in these texts or described as unbridled political
domination.111 The Party is, according to its own self-perception, a
modern, scientifically governed, rule-based organization. 112
The Chinese leadership and Xi Jinping himself have
emphasized the rule-based nature of the Party’s governance model in
their response to the coronavirus pandemic. Early on in the outbreak,
Xi published an article in Qiushi, the Party’s principal theoretical
journal, arguing that it was of utmost importance to fight the epidemic
in a “law-based, scientific and orderly manner.” 113 The harder
epidemic control and prevention was, Xi explained, the more
important it was to adhere to the “rule of law” and to strengthen
Chinese legislation on public health.114 A similar focus on legality
can be found in the P.R.C. State Council’s white paper on the
government’s response to the pandemic.115 The white paper explains
that the government strengthened legal safeguards for epidemic
prevention and control during the pandemic. 116
One aspect of this law-based response can be found in the
Chinese Supreme People’s Court guiding opinions and model cases
110

See ZHONGGONG ZHONGYANG ZHENGFA WEIYUANHUI (中共中央政法委员会
) [CENTRAL POLITICAL & LEGAL COMMITTEE OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST
PARTY], SHEHUI ZHUYI FAZHI LINIAN DUBEN (社会主义法治理念读本)
[Readings on the Socialist Rule of Law Principle] 98–99, 104–109 (2009).
111
See, e.g., id. at 111 (describing Party leadership as ideological leadership,
political leadership and organizational leadership, without elaborating on the
relationship between the Party and the judiciary).
112
XI JINPING, THE GOVERNANCE OF CHINA (VOL. 1), 9–10, 19–20, 54, 89 (2014).
113
Xi Jinping (习近平), Quanmian Tigao Yifa Fangkong Yifa Zhili Nengli,
Jianquan Guojia Gonggong Weisheng Yingji Guanli Tixi (全面提高依法防控依
法治理能力, 健全国家公共卫生应急管理体系) [Comprehensively Improving
Law-Based Epidemic Prevention and Control and the National Public Health
Emergency Management System], QIUSHI (求是) [SEEKING TRUTH] (Feb. 29,
2020), http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/2020-02/29/c_1125641632.htm
[https://perma.cc/HBK7-MBYU] [hereinafter Xi, Comprehensive Improving]. For
an English language description of the article, see Xi’s Article on Improving
Epidemic Prevention and Control to be Published, XINHUA (Mar. 1, 2020),
http://www.china.org.cn/china/2020-03/01/content_75760592.htm
[https://perma.cc/5J96-W452].
114
Xi, Comprehensively Improving, supra note 113.
115
P.R.C. STATE COUNCIL, supra note 11.
116
Id.
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on coronavirus cases. 117 In part, the Supreme People’s Court’s
guidance supports individual rights. In its first set of guiding opinions
on the coronavirus response, the Supreme People’s Court stated that
Chinese people’s courts would not support the termination of
employment contracts of employees who were suspected or
confirmed coronavirus patients.118 At the same time, the Supreme
People’s Court also made use of the self-consciously pragmatic
aspects of Chinese legal thought, which emphasize the “social
effects”, rather than the “legal effects” of a legal decision.119 In its
guiding opinions, the Supreme People’s Court instructed lower level
people’s courts to mitigate adverse economic effects from the

117

See SUP. PEOPLE’S CT., supra note 17; Guanyu Yifa Tuoshan Shenli She
Xinguan Feiyan Yiqing Minshi Anjian Ruogan Wenti de Zhidao Yijian (Yi) (关于
依法妥善审理涉新冠肺炎疫情民事案件若干问题的指导意见（一） )
[Guiding Opinions Concerning the Proper Hearing of Cases Related to the Novel
Coronavirus Epidemic (First)], SUP. PEOPLE’S CT. PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
(Apr. 20, 2020), http://www.court.gov.cn/zixun-xiangqing-226241.html
[https://perma.cc/MYW8-5HTW] (instructing lower courts to ensure the function
of judiciary services); Guanyu Yifa Tuoshan Shenli She Xinguan Feiyan Yiqing
Minshi Anjian Ruogan Wenti de Zhidao Yijian (Er) (关于依法妥善审理涉新冠肺
炎疫情民事案件若干问题的指导意见（二）) [Guiding Opinions Concerning
the Proper Hearing of Cases Related to the Novel Coronavirus Epidemic
(Second)], SUP. PEOPLE’S CT. PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (May 19, 2020),
http://www.court.gov.cn/zixun-xiangqing-230181.html [https://perma.cc/Z9R872D7] (instructing lower courts on issues related to contracts, finance, and
bankruptcy); Guanyu Yifa Tuoshan Shenli She Xinguan Feiyan Yiqing Minshi
Anjian Ruogan Wenti de Zhidao Yijian (San) (关于依法妥善审理涉新冠肺炎疫
情民事案件若干问题的指导意见（三）) [Guiding Opinions Concerning the
Proper Hearing of Cases Related to the Novel Coronavirus Epidemic (Third)],
SUP. PEOPLE’S CT. PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (June 8, 2020),
https://www.chinacourt.org/law/detail/2020/06/id/150170.shtml
[https://perma.cc/VZE4-JUP5] (instructing lower courts on civil procedure).
118
Guanyu Yifa Tuoshan Shenli She Xinguan Feiyan Yiqing Minshi Anjian
Ruogan Wenti de Zhidao Yijian (Yi) (关于依法妥善审理涉新冠肺炎疫情民事案
件若干问题的指导意见（一）) [Guiding Opinions Concerning the Proper
Hearing of Cases Related to the Novel Coronavirus Epidemic (First)], supra note
117, ¶ 4.
119
OFFICE OF THE CENTRAL POLITICAL AND LEGAL AFFAIRS COMMISSION OF THE
CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, SHEHUI ZHUYI FAZHI LINIAN XUEXI WENDA (社会
主义法治理念学习问答） [Questions and Answers on the Socialist Rule of Law
Concept] 31, 191 (2012).
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pandemic through mediation and negotiation. 120 The model cases
released to illustrate this aim describe how Chinese businesses from
fitness clubs to building companies and slaughter houses have been
able to default on their contractual obligations without being forced
into liquidation. 121 The Chinese people’s courts’ role in the
coronavirus response is not, therefore, only to enforce individual
rights but also to prevent the enforcement of such rights from causing
harmful social effects.122
The Party’s response to the pandemic is not limited to legal
processes even in their most pragmatic form. A Marxist-Leninist
political party, such as the CCP, does not base its legitimacy on the
observance of legal processes or, it can be argued, any other rules,
including its own internal regulations.123 Instead of adhering to legal
and other rule-based processes, the supposed advantage of a
communist party leadership compared to liberal democracies is its
ability to embody the will of the proletariat, which is remaking the
world under the laws of dialectical and historical materialism. 124
CCP ideology presumes that the Party represents “advanced
120

Guanyu Yifa Tuoshan Shenli She Xinguan Feiyan Yiqing Minshi Anjian
Ruogan Wenti de Zhidao Yijian (Yi) (关于依法妥善审理涉新冠肺炎疫情民事案
件若干问题的指导意见（一）) [Guiding Opinions Concerning the Proper
Hearing of Cases Related to the Novel Coronavirus Epidemic (First)], supra note
117, ¶ 1.
121
Quanguo Fayuan Fuwu Baozhang Yiqing Fangkong Qijian Fugong Fuchan
Dianxing Anli (Di San Pi) (全国法院服务保障疫情防控期间复工复产典型案例
（第三批）) [Nationwide Model Cases for Ensuring the Resumption of Work and
Production During the Prevention and Control of the Epidemic (Third Batch)],
SUP. PEOPLE’S CT. PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Apr. 22, 2020),
http://www.court.gov.cn/zixun-xiangqing-226771.html [https://perma.cc/ZQD8Q3EQ].
122
For similar legislative measures in other countries, see supra note 18.
123
For an example of this attitude, see, for example, VLADIMIR LENIN, THE
PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION AND THE RENEGADE KAUTSKY (1918), reprinted in
V.I. LENIN COLLECTED WORKS 28, 105 (2nd ed. 1974),
www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1918/oct/10.htm [https://perma.cc/9KTLJ8WN] (describing the dictatorship of the proletariat as the suppression of
bourgeois liberty and equality). I have discussed the role of rules in the CCP’s
governance project elsewhere. See Samuli Seppänen, Interrogating Illiberalism
Through Chinese Communist Party Regulations, 52 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 267
(2019).
124
See generally LENIN, supra note 123 (explaining the advantages of communist
party leadership).
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production forces, advanced culture and the overwhelming majority
of the Chinese people.” 125 Since the actions of Party leaders are
presumed to reflect the advanced forces in society, it is ultimately up
to the Party leaders to decide when to follow established legal and
other rule-based processes and when to abstain from them.126 Formal
legality is, therefore, a concern for Party leaders and ideologues, but
it does not have the same role in the CCP’s governance project as it
does in the liberal narratives on public health.
One consequence of this governance model is skepticism
towards formal bureaucratic processes. Early on in the coronavirus
outbreak, Xi Jinping warned about the dangers of “bureaucratism and
the practice of formalities for formalities’ sake,” which slowed the
government’s effort to contain the outbreak. 127 An editorial in the
influential People’s Daily opined that “formalism” was a “chronic
disease and no less contagious than an epidemic.” 128 Indeed, Wuhan

125

See What Is “Three Represents” CPC Theory?, CHINA.ORG.CN,
http://www.china.org.cn/english/zhuanti/3represents/68735.htm
[https://perma.cc/Y5DU-6LSB] (last visited Apr. 7, 2020) (explaining the “Three
Represents”).
126
Among other things, this implication is achieved through the principle of
democratic centralism, which holds that “all Party members must . . . . firmly
uphold the authority and centralized, unified leadership of the Central Committee
with Comrade Xi Jinping at the core . . . . ” Zhongguo Gongchandang
Zhangcheng (中国共产党章程) [Constitution of the Communist Party of China]
(rev’d by and adopted at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of
China, Oct. 24, 2017), § General Program,
http://language.chinadaily.com.cn/19thcpcnationalcongress/201711/06/content_34191468.htm [https://perma.cc/ZB5D-NVLD] (introducing the
principle of democratic centralism). The matter is, however, paradoxical, since
the Party also instructs its members to “set a fine example in abiding by the laws
and regulations of the state.” Id. at art. 3. See also LIU, infra note 171
(discussing the principles established in the Constitution of the Communist Party
of China).
127
See Wang, Two Important Meetings, supra note 19 (urging the importance of
suppressing formalism and bureaucratism). For English language commentary on
Xi Jinping’s statement, see Deaths in China Rise, With No Sign of Slowdown,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2020, updated Mar. 12, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/04/world/asia/coronaviruschina.html?emc=rss&partner=rss [https://perma.cc/8BW9-CN6D].
128
See Fangkong ye Gao Xingshi Zhuyi, Yao Zewen Geng Yao Wenze (防控也搞
形式主义，要责问更要问责) [Formalism in Prevention and Control Must Be
Called to Account and Condemned], PEOPLE’S DAILY (Feb. 2, 2020),
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authorities’ failure to take timely action against the coronavirus
outbreak can be seen as a consequence of the ills of bureaucratism
and formalism. As a new disease, coronavirus was not on a list of
designated infectious diseases, which would have triggered reporting
obligations within the Chinese healthcare system. 129
The
“bureaucratic and formalist” organizational culture–in effect, rigid
and hierarchical reporting mechanisms and the incentives to avoid
responsibility for unwelcome news—allowed local authorities in
Wuhan to keep Beijing in the dark about the outbreak. 130 Party
leaders, therefore, aim to ensure that “formalism” does not stand in
way of effective disease control. One means for doing this is the
Party’s internal discipline supervision. Discipline supervision is
“extra-legal” in the sense that it is outside the purview of the Chinese
people’s courts (which themselves are under the Party’s control). 131
In the context of the coronavirus pandemic, the Party’s Central
Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) has decreed that Party
cadres must “deeply understand the spirit of General Secretary Xi
Jinping’s important instructions and important speeches.” 132 The
http://opinion.people.com.cn/n1/2020/0202/c1003-31567364.html
[https://perma.cc/69Q2-EHNZ] (appealing to officials to refuse formalism).
129
See generally Wang Xixin (王锡锌), Chuanranbing Yiqing Xinxi Gongkai de
Zhang’ai ji Kefu (传染病疫情信息公开的障碍及克服) [The Obstacles of, and
Solutions for, Information Disclosure in Infectious Disease Pandemics], FAXUE
(Mar. 28, 2020), https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/raqY4vNJmKz2UCHTEQgpZg
[https://perma.cc/YSX2-AEET] (reviewing the rules for information disclosure of
infectious disease pandemics).
130
For Chinese legal scholarship discussing the problems with the organizational
culture in the pandemic, see Wang Jianglian (汪江连), Xinguan Feiyan Yiqing
Fangkong ying Shiyong “Weiji Fazhi” (新冠肺炎疫情防控应适用”危机法治”)
[Apply “Crisis Rule of Law” to Coronavirus Epidemic Prevention and Control],
PKU L. (Feb. 19, 2020),
http://pkulaw.cn/fulltext_form.aspx?Gid=335655869&Db=art
[https://perma.cc/3XRS-FVHU] (arguing the importance of adopting “crisis rule
of law” to combat bureaucratism). See also GLOB. TIMES, Probe Findings on Li
Wenliang, supra note 86 (describing how local authorities prevented Dr. Li
Wenliang from posting the information of the pandemic online).
131
See generally FLORA SAPIO, SOVEREIGN POWER AND THE LAW IN CHINA 8
(2010) (discussing shuanggui as well as other legal exceptions in China); Ling Li,
Political-Legal Order and the Curious Double Character of China’s Courts, 6
ASIAN J.L. & SOC’Y 19, 31, 36–37 (2019) (discussing the Party’s supremacy in
making, interpreting, applying, and enforcing the law).
132
CCDI, supra note 21.
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staff in discipline inspection commissions must also “struggle
heroically” and target “formalist bureaucratic practices.” 133
Perhaps as a consequence of the Party’s ambiguous approach
to formalism and legality (which are two separate issues), some of the
disease control measures deployed by the Chinese government in the
coronavirus pandemic have allegedly violated Chinese laws, as
mentioned in Part II above. Professor Shen Kui of Peking University
Law School, for instance, has pointed out that all restrictions on the
personal rights of Chinese citizens need to be based on laws adopted
by the National People’s Congress and its Standing Committee.134 In
the field of public health, the use of coercive measures, such as
isolations, quarantines and lockdowns, must follow the processes set
up in the P.R.C. Law on the Prevention and Control of Infectious
Diseases.135 Shen Kui argues that many measures adopted by local
authorities, such as the coercive home quarantining of people in
Zhejiang province described in Part II above, violated this process. 136
Professor Tong Zhiwei from the East China University of Political
Science and Law has expressed similar concerns about the coercive
isolation of people in their homes.137 Zhao Hong, a professor at the
China University of Political Science and Law in Beijing, has argued
that restrictions on the freedom of movement in large Chinese cities
and the banning of public gatherings “clearly violated legal

133

Id.
See generally Shen, supra note 20 (urging the importance of respecting basic
human rights in the pandemic).
135
Id.; see generally Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Chuanranbing Fangzhi Fa (
中华人民共和国传染病防治法) [P.R.C. Law on the Prevention and Control of
Infectious Diseases] (promulgated and rev’d by the Standing Comm. Nat’l
People’s Cong., June 28, 2004, effective Dec. 1, 2004), art. 43 [hereinafter P.R.C.
Law on the Prevention and Control of Infectious Diseases] (stipulating the
procedural requirements for the declaration of affected areas, the adoption of
emergency measures, and the implementation of lockdowns).
136
See Shen, supra note 20 (arguing against measures infringing personal
freedom).
137
See Tong, supra note 20 (criticizing measures adopted by local governments to
limit personal freedom).

134
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stipulations.” 138 Concerns about rights infringements in the
pandemic have also appeared in the Chinese mainstream media. 139

VI.

IDEOLOGICAL UNMASKING

Advocates of both liberal and illiberal narratives can argue
that the coronavirus pandemic reveals endemic weaknesses in the
opposite ideological outlook. From the illiberal perspective, the
pandemic has demonstrated that liberal governments are inefficient
and hypocritical.140 The critique against the inefficiency of liberal
regimes is a classic theme in illiberal political thought. Nineteenth
and twentieth century opponents of liberalism argued that liberal
governments were unwilling to restrict civil and political rights in an
emergency situation and, as a consequence, they were unable to fight
against various emergencies and political insurgences, in
particular. 141 From the illiberal perspective, specific concepts of
138

Matthew Walsh et al., China’s Super-Strict City Lockdowns May Be Illegal,
CAIXIN GLOB. (Feb 18, 2020), https://www.caixinglobal.com/2020-02-18/chinassuper-strict-city-lockdowns-may-be-illegal-101517249.html
[https://perma.cc/V8HA-74DC].
139
See generally Cai Fei (蔡斐), Ruci Zhan “Yi”, Qunzhong hen Shengqi (如此战
“疫”, 群众很生气) [In This Battle Against the Epidemic, People Are Upset],
RENMINWANG (Feb. 17, 2020),
http://opinion.people.com.cn/n1/2020/0217/c223228-31591169.html
[https://perma.cc/EK3U-F5XS] (discussing the need for strict law application in
emergency situations).
140
See generally MO, supra note 11; Wang Xiangsui (王湘穗), Yihou Shidai de
Quanqiu Geju yu Zhong-Mei Guanxi (疫后时代的全球格局与中美关系) [The
Global Landscape of the Post-Epidemic Era and Sino-US Relations], AI SIXIANG
(May 15, 2020), http://www.aisixiang.com/data/121697.html
[https://perma.cc/F56J-GH8A] (arguing that the U.S. and Europe have fared
poorly in their coronavirus response and discussing the U.S. President Donald
Trump’s effort to shift the blame for the inefficient coronavirus response to
China); Yang Sheng, Trump Tweet Infuriates China, GLOB. TIMES (Mar. 18,
2020), https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1182873.shtml
[https://perma.cc/47MX-EBBU] (discussing the opinion that U.S. President
Donald Trump is trying to “cover his administration’s terrible response” by
blaming China).
141
See generally JUAN DONOSO CORTÉS, SPEECH ON DICTATORSHIP (1849),
reprinted in SELECTED WORKS OF JUAN DONOSO CORTÉS 45, 46 (Jeffrey P.
Johnson trans., 2000) (stating that a dictatorship is a legitimate form of
governance when law is not enough to save society); CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL
THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY 63 (George
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liberal legal thought, such as the principle of proportionality,
encourage inaction in the face of public health emergencies. 142 In the
coronavirus pandemic, a critic may argue, principles and processes
that were designed for previous epidemics delayed or prevented
liberal democracies from taking measures that were necessary to
combat the new virus.143 For instance, the initial applications of the
IHR to the coronavirus outbreak concluded that there was no
scientific evidence for the efficiency of travel restrictions, and that
such restrictions, therefore, violated the dignity, human rights and
fundamental freedoms of persons. 144 This conclusion was an
Schwab trans., 2005) (describing liberalism as negotiation and “a cautious
halfmeasure”).
142
The principle of proportionality requires that a limitation of a right be
appropriate and necessary. See Garde, supra note 93, at 242 (discussing the
principle of proportionality). See also SIRACUSA PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, at art.
I, § A, ¶ 10 (defining “necessity” as proportionality).
143
See Mo, supra note 11 (stating that many capitalist governments’ response to
the pandemic was slow and full of loopholes and arguing that China’s
performance in combating coronavirus illustrated the advantages of its socialist
system).
144
Roojin Habibi et al., Do Not Violate the International Health Regulations
During the COVID-19 Outbreak, 395 LANCET 664 (2020),
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(20)30373-1 [https://perma.cc/F3EJ-F876]
(arguing that the travel restrictions against China (i) were not supported by
scientific evidence; (ii) did not constitute the least restrictive means; (iii) could
not be adopted as a precaution under IHR; and (iv) consequently failed to restrict
the dignity, human rights and fundamental freedoms of persons). For earlier
research on travel restrictions, see Ana L.P. Mateus et al., Effectiveness of Travel
Restrictions in the Rapid Containment of Human Influenza: A Systematic Review,
92 BULL W.H.O. 868 (2014) (asserting that travel restrictions can delay but
cannot prevent the dissemination of influenza). Rights-based views were
published in Chinese media at the beginning of the outbreak. See Wang Xigen
(汪习根), “Yiqing Qishi” shi dui Renquan de Wuqing Tiaozhan (“疫情歧视”是
对人权的无情挑战) [“Epidemic Discrimination” is a Relentless Challenge to
Human Rights], PEOPLE’S DAILY (Feb. 18, 2020),
http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/202002/18/nw.D110000renmrb_20200218_1-11.htm [https://perma.cc/D32Y-VJD2]
(arguing against discrimination arising out of the pandemic). See also Richard
Pérez-Peña, Virus Hits Europe Harder Than China. Is That the Price of an Open
Society?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/19/world/europe/europe-chinacoronavirus.html?referringSource=articleShare [https://perma.cc/T6ZL-JABH]
(arguing that the virus has hit Europe harder because “governments aren’t used to
giving harsh orders, and citizens aren’t used to following them”).
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authentic application of the IHR at the time (although not the only
possible interpretation), 145 but from a critical perspective it also
demonstrated the inefficiency of rights-based processes. A promoter
of illiberal narratives and of Chinese-style Marxism, in particular,
may contrast liberal rights-based approaches (unfavorably) with the
mobilization of masses in the Chinese “people’s war” against the
pandemic.146
Another classic theme in illiberal political thought accuses
liberalism of hypocrisy. Liberal principles, according to this criticism,
provide an ideological mask for a regime that is in certain
foundational ways as repressive as illiberal regimes. 147 In an
emergency, the classic illiberal argument runs, liberal indecisiveness
either proves fatal (potentially causing the liberal regime to be
replaced by an illiberal political order) or it is discarded in favor of
measures that are not based on liberal first principles in any
meaningful way. 148 . A critic may point out that in the present
145

The IHR requires, inter alia, that health measures be based on scientific
principles and available scientific evidence. If scientific evidence is insufficient,
the health measures must be based on “available information including from
WHO and other relevant intergovernmental organizations and international
bodies.” See WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO], International Health
Regulations, art. 43, ¶ 2 (3rd ed. 2015). IHR also provides that the
“implementation of these Regulations shall be with full respect for the dignity,
human rights and fundamental freedoms of persons.” See id. at art. 3, ¶ 1. In
retrospect it can be said that the available scientific evidence at the beginning of
the pandemic was insufficient and that the restrictions were, therefore, allowed
under IHR. In the beginning of the pandemic, however, scholars were operating
on evidence from previous epidemics. See generally Habibi et al., supra note
144.
146
See Wang Hui (汪晖), Jintian, Weisheme Yao Jinian Liening? Xie zai Liening
Danchen 150 Zhounian zhi ji (今天，为什么要纪念列宁？写在列宁诞辰 150
周年之际) [Why Should We Commemorate Lenin Today? Written on Lenin’s
150th Anniversary], WENHUA ZONGSHEN (文化纵横) (Apr. 22, 2020),
https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/5WdKGSbmGeD5Q3D1bCEfOw (discussing China’s
coronavirus response as an instance of China’s people-centered socialism).
147
See KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH ENGELS, MANIFESTO OF THE COMMUNIST
PARTY, reprinted in THE MARX-ENGELS READER 469, 487 (Robert Tucker ed., 2d
ed., 1978). See also SCHMITT, THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL, supra note 10, at
79 (arguing that even an apparently nonpolitical system serves friend-and-enemy
groupings); SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY, supra note 141, at 66 (arguing that
every government is necessarily absolute).
148
CORTÉS, supra note 10, at 174–175.
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pandemic, governments in liberal democracies have taken up
measures that are similar or identical to those first adopted by the
Chinese government. Following China’s example, for instance, the
Italian government placed individual provinces, and finally the entire
country, under a police-enforced lockdown. 149 The assumption that
such measures were legitimate because their subjects agreed to them,
or could have agreed to them, through a democratic process appears
disingenuous to a critic. When individuals contest coercive measures
in a court of law or elsewhere, they demonstrate their disagreement
with these measures, even though the same individuals agreed to, or
could have agreed to, these measures in a democratic process. For a
critic, the role of the liberal narratives is, therefore, to add ideological
gloss to any action that a liberal democratic government takes (or
does not take).
To be sure, the measures adopted in Italy and in other liberal
democracies were not as strict as those taken in China, and in
particular, in Wuhan. In contrast to Wuhan, where residents were
locked inside their apartments and monitored and supported by
community workers, Italians were able to go out shopping and take
care of other urgent needs.150 While the Italian measures were more
lenient, a critic may point out that they were also less efficient than
the Chinese ones.151 Lenient lockdown measures in the United States
and the United Kingdom also had worse results (in terms of casualties)
149

Marzia Lazzerini & Giovanni Putoto, COVID-19 in Italy: Momentous
Decisions and Many Uncertainties, 8 LANCET 641 (2020),
https://www.thelancet.com/journals/langlo/article/PIIS2214-109X(20)301108/fulltext [https://perma.cc/U97B-3AFB]; Andrea Remuzzi & Giuseppe Remuzzi,
COVID-19 and Italy: What Next?, LANCET (2020),
https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(20)306279/fulltext [https://perma.cc/4M4C-RGNR].
150
Lazzerini & Putoto, supra note 149. See also Coronavirus: How are
lockdowns and other measures being enforced?, B.B.C. (Mar. 17, 2020),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-51911340 [https://perma.cc/B9HH-SVTE]
(reporting on the strict lockdown implemented in Wuhan, which included “guards
at entrances to resident buildings to keep people inside”).
151
See Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) Situation Report–80, WORLD
HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO] (Apr. 9, 2020),
https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/coronaviruse/situationreports/20200409-sitrep-80-covid-19.pdf?sfvrsn=1b685d64_6
[https://perma.cc/Q6WN-3PX8] (displaying reports on the coronavirus pandemic
situation from countries around the world).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol16/iss1/3

60

U. PA. ASIAN L. REV.

[Vol. 16

compared to the Chinese methods.152 From the illiberal perspective,
the Chinese government’s coronavirus response may have appeared
excessively repressive to liberal sensibilities, but it protected Chinese
citizens from the disease more effectively than the measures adopted
in liberal democratic regimes.153 A promoter of illiberal narratives
may, consequently, conclude that liberal governments were willing
to accept more casualties in the pandemic than the P.R.C.
government.154
The liberal response to such critiques may reassert the
inherent value of the liberal first principles and the institutions that
are justified on those bases. As imperfect and aspirational as liberal
democratic institutions may be, allowing government agencies or
Communist Party cadres to impose public health measures without
democratic and judicial oversight would be a far worse arrangement.
Since liberal first principles are protected by legal rights, it is the
judiciary—rather than, say, the CCP’s discipline inspection organs—
that is best placed to determine the extent of these rights. 155 The
present pandemic is no reason to give up the rights-based approach
152
See Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Situation Report 60, WORLD
HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO] (Mar. 19, 2020),
https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/coronaviruse/situationreports/20200320-sitrep-60-covid-19.pdf?sfvrsn=d2bb4f1f_2
[https://perma.cc/UQH6-PWAE] (displaying reports on the coronavirus pandemic
situation from countries around the world).
153
See WHO, supra note 7, at 16–18 (describing China’s public health measures
against coronavirus outbreak as “ambitious, agile and aggressive,” as well as
“bold” and “science-based”); Editorial: COVID-19: Too Little, Too Late?, 395
LANCET 755 (2020), https://www.thelancet.com/action/showPdf?pii=S01406736%2820%2930522-5 [https://perma.cc/2KBK-FNGX] (stating that “the
colossal public health efforts of the Chinese Government have saved thousands of
lives”); Editorial: Emerging Understandings of 2019-nCoV, 395 LANCET 311
(2020), https://www.thelancet.com/action/showPdf?pii=S01406736%2820%2930186-0 [https://perma.cc/7BG6-CFXS] (stating that “Chinese
authorities are meeting international standards”).
154
See Schneider, supra note 14 (predicting that America will become the world’s
most infected country, despite its confidence in its own system). Although not
making this claim explicitly, the P.R.C. State Council’s white paper on the
coronavirus pandemic emphasizes that the Chinese government prioritized
people’s lives instead of economic interests in its response. P.R.C. STATE
COUNCIL, supra note 12.
155
See Alicia Ely Yamin, Promoting Equity in Health: What Role for Courts?, 16
HEALTH & HUM. RTS J. 1, (2014) (noting the critical role of litigation for basic
human dignity and non-discrimination in health care).
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to health, let alone the liberal democratic governance model, even
though some rights may need to be momentarily restricted and even
though public health outcomes in liberal democracies may be worse
by some measures than those in the P.R.C.156 Such setbacks are not
the ultimate test for the legitimacy of liberal democracies. In any
event, the coronavirus pandemic is not an existential crisis or a warlike event for liberal democracies, as it tellingly is for the P.R.C.
according to the Chinese government’s own white paper on its
coronavirus response.157
In this context, a promoter of the liberal approaches may
concede that the above-described claims of the human rights-based
approach are analytically unhelpful. 158 Perhaps it is analytically
clearer to frame human rights conceptions as checks and balances on
public health measures, rather than to assume that human rights and
public health measures are inherently interrelated and mutually
enforcing. Human rights protections may sometimes lead to worse
public health outcomes than uninhibited government action.
Nevertheless, the argument remains that this is an acceptable outcome
for organizing society through the liberal first principles.
From the liberal perspective—and indeed from any
perspective that is critical of illiberal narratives on political power—
the coronavirus pandemic also reveals the inherent fragility of
illiberal political systems. 159 As described above, a central
justification for illiberal regimes is their ability to provide resultsbased political leadership, which transcends liberal law-based
governance. Unbridled by legal and participatory processes, the
156

See Babones, supra note 5 (demonstrating how those with a liberal perspective
may find the approach from China to be unappealing despite the outcomes that
can result from such measures being put in place).
157
See P.R.C. STATE COUNCIL, supra note 12 (describing the pandemic as a
“great war”) and infra text accompanying note 164.
158
See supra text accompanying notes 61–65 (regarding the interrelatedness of
public health measures and human rights promoted by the human rights-based
approach) and 93–95 (regarding the critique of the interrelatedness of public
health measures and human rights).
159
See, e.g., Editorial: Virus Exposes China’s Achilles’ Heel, TAIPEI TIMES (Feb.
7, 2020),
https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2020/02/07/2003730505
[https://perma.cc/PR8T-W297]; Kavanagh, supra note 1, at 136; Pei, supra note 1
(discussing examples of fragility in the illiberal political systems from the liberal
perspective).
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Chinese party-state can build hospitals in a matter of days. 160
Nevertheless, when such direct action fails to yield positive results,
or when it appears that the illiberal government model itself has
adverse consequences for people’s wellbeing—as many in China
thought was the case in the first few months of the coronavirus
outbreak—illiberal leaders cannot fall back on arguments about
liberal first principles to legitimize their power. Indeed, a critic may
point out that the repression of civil and political rights has stifled
many parts of the Chinese society, built up dissent, and prevented
grassroots information from reaching central authorities. 161 Judging
by the postings on Chinese social media in the early stages of the
pandemic in January and February 2020, many Chinese citizens did
not see the initial cover-up of the coronavirus outbreak as a glitch or
an anomaly of China’s one-Party system, but as its predictable
outcome. 162 The public criticism abated as the government’s
response proved effective against the virus. 163 Yet the Chinese
160

See Liu, supra note 105 (explaining how the Chinese socialist system allows
the government to concentrate on accomplishing major tasks such as building
hospitals in a short amount of time).
161
See Liu et al., Antagonists exploit Dr Li's death to slander China, GLOB. TIMES
(Feb. 8, 2020), https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1178876.shtml
[https://perma.cc/6JLH-Y84W] (detailing the Chinese government’s efforts to
control public discourse during the pandemic). For stability maintenance in
China, see XUEZHI GUO, CHINA’S SECURITY STATE: PHILOSOPHY, EVOLUTION,
AND POLITICS 418–419 (2012). For an assessment of China’s social and political
conditions today, see CARL MINZNER, END OF AN ERA: HOW CHINA’S
AUTHORITARIAN REVIVAL IS UNDERMINING ITS RISE (2018); Cf. Eric Li, Xi
Jinping Is a ‘Good Emperor’, FOREIGN POL’Y (May 14, 2020),
https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/14/xi-jinping-good-emperor-coronavirus/
[https://perma.cc/7U5M-CRJZ] (describing how the pandemic has increased some
people’s trust in the Communist Party).
162
Li Yuan, Coronavirus Weakens China’s Powerful Propaganda Machine, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 26, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/26/business/chinacoronavirus-propaganda.html [https://perma.cc/UM3C-LSMK] (discussing the
initial public criticism in China against the Chinese government’s coronavirus
response); Pei, supra note 1.
163
For surveys on coronavirus-related citizen satisfaction in China, see THE
WORLD IN CRISIS: A GLOBAL PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY ACROSS 23 COUNTRIES
(SUMMARY REPORT) (TOLUNA & BLACKBOX 2020),
https://issuu.com/blackbox4/docs/world_in_crisis_final_report?fr=sZTM1ODEy
NzA0Nzc [https://perma.cc/627C-HXWS]; Cary Wu, How Chinese Citizens View
Their Government’s Coronavirus Response, THE CONVERSATION (Jun. 5, 2020),
https://theconversation.com/how-chinese-citizens-view-their-governments-
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government itself has recognized that the pandemic was “a major test”
for the Chinese party-state, and that its outcome was not a
preordained matter. 164 In the next emergency, the government’s
efforts may not turn out to be as effective.
For a critic, the precariousness of illiberal regimes is
highlighted and exacerbated by Chinese political leaders’ conflicting
approach to formal legal processes. As pointed out above, Chinese
leaders simultaneously call for the strict implementation of the rule
of law principle in the management of the coronavirus pandemic,
while they also fight against formalism and bureaucratism. 165 In the
Party ideologues’ mind, the two objectives belong to a coherent
governance ideology.166 The rule of law stands for the dutiful (but
not too dutiful) observance of national laws and Party regulations,
whereas bureaucratism and formalism are reflected by inefficient
action and work practices. There are problems in this system—such
as the bureaucratic reporting practices of epidemic outbreaks—but
they can be ironed out through legal and institutional reforms. 167
Chinese legal scholars have, for instance, called for legal reforms,
which would allow disclosure of necessary information, while
suppressing undesired, socially harmful speech. 168 Such reform calls

coronavirus-response-139176 [https://perma.cc/CD6T-PUPS] (pointing towards
public satisfaction with the handling of the coronavirus pandemic in China).
164
P.R.C. STATE COUNCIL, supra note 12.
165
See supra text accompanying notes 127–133.
166
For a statement about the role of formal law in fighting formalism, see Xia
Chuntao (夏春涛), Tuijin Yifa Zhiguo Zhongzai Jianchi Dang de Lingdao (推进
依法治国重在坚持党的领导) [Promoting Ruling the Country According to Law
and Upholding Party Leadership], CPC NEWS (Nov. 26, 2014)
http://theory.people.com.cn/n/2014/1126/c40531-26098237.html
[https://perma.cc/8LCB-GQLJ].
167
Wang, Apply “Crisis Rule of Law” to Coronavirus Epidemic Prevention and
Control, supra note 130.
168
See Hu Jinguang (胡锦光), Yifa Fangyi Neng Baozheng Zhengfu Gongxinli (依
法防疫能保证政府公信力) [Preventing the Epidemic in Accordance with Law
Can Ensure Governmental Credibility], AI SIXIANG (May 3, 2020),
http://www.aisixiang.com/data/121147.html [https://perma.cc/R49J-MEXZ]
(discussing legal reforms such as providing sufficient legal justification for public
health measures). For reform calls, see also Wang, Apply “Crisis Rule of Law” to
Coronavirus Epidemic Prevention and Control, supra note 130 (discussing
reforms to improve disclosure of information during pandemics).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol16/iss1/3

64

U. PA. ASIAN L. REV.

[Vol. 16

rest on the notion that it is possible to make the Chinese party-state
predictably governed and transparent.
From a critical perspective, however, it appears that such
reform attempts clash with the basic tenets of the Party’s governance
project. During the present pandemic, Party leaders have made use
of laws and regulations to rein in local Party cadres, who violate the
commands of the central leadership. 169 Yet the same laws and
regulations can also be used to criticize the central government’s
commands. 170 As long as Party leaders emphasize ideological
conformity, disclosing inconvenient facts about the reality risks
running afoul of the officially sanctioned versions of that reality. A
critic may wonder whether Party leaders truly are willing to create a
culture of formalism within the state and Party organs, which would
allow the airing of important concerns about Chinese society. Such
a culture could eventually be used to hold Party leaders accountable
for their actions.171 Indeed, it appears that no matter how Chinese
disease control and prevention laws are formulated, China’s oneparty system will end up providing Party cadres extralegal powers to
trump inconvenient interpretations of legal norms—and attempts to
disclose information about, say, future public health threats.
To be sure, the above-described arguments are not fatal for
any ideological project. Facing criticism, defenders of liberal and
illiberal ideological narratives may simply restate their core articles
of faith and hope that, in the final analysis, it is their ideological
position that most credibly accounts for the unfolding events.
Depending on one’s perspective, the high human and economic costs
of the pandemic in liberal democracies can attest to the inefficiency
and relative disregard for human life and dignity in liberal regimes—
or to the robustness of liberal democracies, which can afford to
address public health emergencies in a less than efficient manner
169

See XINHUA, Xi Stresses Law-based Infection Prevention, supra note 15
(describing Xi’s instructions to Party committees and governments at all levels to
improve law-based governance).
170
See supra text accompanying notes 136–138 (listing criticisms from liberalminded academics and lawyers towards coercive public health measures).
171
For such opportunities, see Liu Songshan (刘松山), Dang de Lingdao Xieru
1982 nian Xianfa de Lishi Huigu yu Xin Qidai (党的领导写入 1982 年宪法的历
史回顾与新期待) [A Historical Review and New Expectation On the Party’s
Leadership in the 1982 Constitution], HENAN CAIJING ZHENGFA DAXUE XUEBAO
(河南财经政法大学学报), no. 3, 2014, at 1, 18.
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without jeopardizing their very existence. Conversely, the P.R.C.
government’s ability to respond to public health emergencies is either
compromised by the ills of illiberalism—or aided by the regime’s
ability to suspend rights and legal processes for the greater good.
Promoters of both narratives can also rely on counterfactual
arguments. The pandemic would have unfolded in a less damaging
manner, if liberal democratic governments had adhered to the rightsbased approach more closely—or if the P.R.C. government had been
more centralized and less formalist and bureaucratic. The role of
ideological narratives is to help people make such leaps of faith.

VII.

CONCLUSION

This Article has provided a tentative sketch of liberal and
illiberal ideological narratives on the coronavirus pandemic. To a
large extent, these narratives highlight the idiosyncratic aspects and,
more critically, endemic weaknesses, of the opposing ideological
outlook. From the illiberal perspective, promoters of liberal
narratives on governance and public health can be said to focus too
much on procedural legitimacy and, consequently, they appear to be
ill-placed to acknowledge and respond to public health emergencies.
From the liberal perspective, advocates of illiberal narratives appear
to be responding to a never-ending emergency situation and,
consequently, they seem unable to take full advantage of procedural
legitimacy and rule-based governance in order to prevent public
health emergencies from occurring. The unsettled nature of these
ideological arguments and the anomalies they bring out also puts into
question the basic assumptions of both narratives. On the one hand,
it seems aspirational—or outright fictious—to argue that the
coronavirus response in liberal democracies is based on respect for
individual freedom, human dignity and other liberal first principles.
On the other hand, the image of a strong stable government projected
by the CCP seems to be based on aspirational notions about the
coherence and resilience of the Party’s governance project. In the
middle of the coronavirus pandemic, it appears that the coronavirus
follows no ideological script.
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